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In the past decade, collective bargaining has 
obtained a new lease on life.^ Through the signing of 
presidential and gubernatorial executive orders and the 
passage of state laws, employees in the public sector 
have obtained and begun to exercise the right to 
organize and bargain collectively over their terms and 
conditions of employment. These rights, however, did 
not come without a struggle on the part of the public 
servant, nor did they come swiftly. 
Since 1919, the drive for collective bargaining 
for public school teachers has been underway. According 
to Moskow, the struggle gained impetus in December, 
1961, when the United Federation of Teachers, a local 
^See for instance: Solomon Barkin, The Peeline 
of the Labor Movement (Santa Barbara, California: 
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1961); 
Paul Jacobs, 01 d Before _i_t_s Time: Co i 1 ect i ve Ba rqa ? n ? nq 
at 23 (Santa Barbara, California; Center for the Study 
of Uemocratic Institutions, 1963); Joel Seidman, "The 
Sources for Future Growth and Decline in American Trade 
Unions," Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annua 1 Meetinq, 
Industrial Relations Researen Associat ?on (Madison, 
Wisconsin: 1965), pp~ 69-103; and Joseph Shister, "The 
Direction of Unionism 1 9^+7 - 1 967 ; Thrust or Drift?" 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 20, No. 4, 
July, 1967, pp. 573-601. 
2 
affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers, was 
given support in the form of personnel and financial 
i 
resources by the labor movement. The major contributor 
of support was the Industrial Union Department of the 
^AFL-CIO. Upon receipt of these contributions, the AFT 
joined the IUD. Since then the IUD has been deeply 
involved in organizing campaigns for collective 
bargaining. In addition, the National Education 
Association has been spending huge sums of money toward 
the same outcome.2 
In 19^3 the nurses of California started their 
long drive for collective bargaining rights when they 
formed the California State Nurses Association. It was 
this association that showed what collective action 
could do to improve the terms and conditions of employ¬ 
ment.3 It was this association that guided the American 
Nurses Association to unanimously adopt the Economic 
Security Program in 19^6. The objectives of this 
program were: "(1) to secure for nurses, through their 
professional associations, protection and improvement 
2Michael H. Moskow, "Collective Bargaining for 
Public School Teachers," in Critical Issues in Labor, 
ed. by Max S. Wortman (New YoricThe Macmillan 
Company, 1969), pp. 87-38. 
3Max S. Wortman, Critica1 Issues in Labor (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, i 9o9), p.~T"0. 
3 
of their economic security--reasonab1e and satisfying 
conditions of employment; and (2) ... to assure the 
public that professional nursing service of high quality 
and in sufficient quantity, will be available for the 
sick of the country."^ Since that time several states 
have passed laws enabling nurses to bargain collectively. 
These two groups are by no means the only ones in 
the public sector that have spent time and money to 
advance the cause of collective bargaining. Similarly, 
transit workers, fire fighters, policemen, as well as 
federal employees, among others, have struggled for the 
right to bargain collectively over terms and conditions 
of employment. 
Every year the number of union members in the 
public sector is increasing. With this increase has 
come substantial changes in work relationships and 
working conditions--including the possibility of work 
stoppages. Although strikes by public employees are 
prohibited by law in nearly every state, such stoppages 
have occurred with increasing frequency in recent years. 
One possible solution to the problem of strikes 
in the public sector is called compulsory arbitration. 
4"The ANA Economic Security Program," A,merican 
Journal of Nursinq, Vol. 47, No. 2, (February, 1947), 
p. 70. 
4 
In effect, compulsory arbitration relies upon nthe 
persuasion of power rather than the power of persuasion".5 
Accord'ng to Sanford Cohen, 
Under compulsory arbitration, strikes are 
prohibited by law, and disputes, if otherwise 
unresolved, must be decided by a specified 
arbitration process. The idea of compulsory 
arbitration has much surface appeal. Actually, 
it has dangers and problems. The major argu¬ 
ment for compulsion is that it is a relatively 
effective method of stopping strikes that for 
one reason or another must not be allowed to 
occur. The arguments against it challenge 
the workabi1ity.as well as the alleged value 
of the process.b 
The role of compulsory arbitration in collective 
barcainine has long been controversial.^7 However,' 
until the late 1960's, the arguments for and against 
its use in the public sector were purely theoretical. 
In 1955 these theoretical arguments began to be realis¬ 
tic. For example, Wyoming was the first state to 
legislate compulsory arbitration as the final step to 
5 K e i I W. Chamberlain and James W. Kuhn, Co 1 1 ect ? ve 
Barcaininq (2nd ed., New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1965), p. 413. 
^Sanford Cohen, Labor in the United States (3rd 
ed., Ohio: Cnar1es E. Merr iTT Pub 1ishinq Company, 
1970), p. 267. 
7See for example: Herbert R. Northrup, Compu1 sory 
Arbit rat ion and Government 1ntervent ?on in Labor 
Disputes (Washinqton: Labor Policy Association, Inc., 
T9°ZT. 
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impasses in negotiations between public employers and 
certain groups of public employees. Although the 
i 
Wyoming statute applied only to firefighters, it set 
the stage for other states to enact compulsory 
arbitration statutes. 
Since 1965, five other states have followed: 
Rhode Island (1968), Pennsylvania (1968), Michigan (1969), 
Hawaii (1970), and Vermont (1970). 
Since the State of Rhode Island and Providence 
Q 
Plantations0 has made no provision for compiling any 
information on the experience under the act, it would 
appear appropriate that a detailed analysis of one area 
of employment covered by the law, namely, the police 
departments, would greatly aid all parties concerned. 
The parties would include the Onion, the management, 
arbitrators, the legislature in Rhode Island, and other 
state legislatures contemplating similar laws. Such a 
study is intended to aid in an appraisal of the effec¬ 
tiveness of compulsory arbitration boards in the public 
sector. 
Purpose of the Research Project 
The purposes of this project are: (1) to describe 
&The official title of the State is The State of 
Rnode Island and Providence Plantations, hereafter re¬ 
ferred to as the State of Rhode Island or as Rnode Island. 
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how the tripartite compulsory arbitration boards 
operate in the State of Rhode Island; and (2) to 
consider some of the effects of these compulsory 
arbitration ‘boards upon police labor-management 
re 1 ationships. in the State of Rhode Island. 
Objectives of the Study 
This study will determine whether or not the use 
of collective bargaining in the public sector has 
decreased in the State of Rhode Island. In other words, 
since both parties (labor and the corporate authority) 
know that a third party will resolve any and all dis¬ 
putes, they could feel, as has been suggested by cities 
and towns with compulsory arbitration, that they do not 
have to work as diligently as they might to arrive at a 
mutually acceptable and determined solution. 
• Another objective of this study is to ascertain 
any possible changes which should take place. One 
possible change might be in the board itself (that is, 
the composition of the arbitration board or the proce¬ 
dures by which the members of the board are chosen). A 
second possible change might take place in the procedures 
which the board follows. 
Depending on the effect that compulsory arbitration 
has on the collective bargaining process itself and on 
7 
participants' satisfaction as a whole, statements could 
be made as to the impact that compulsory arbitration 
has had on the 1abor-management relationship in a 
specific situation. 
Significance of the Study 
In a recent article by Hervey A. Juris and Kay B. 
Hutchison,9 the legal status of collective action by 
municipal law enforcement officers was studied by 
individual states. They found that: (1) police 
employee organizations exist in large numbers across 
the United States; (2) these organizations are police- 
only local units; and (3) most of these organizations 
function as unions regardless of their affiliation. 
Moreover, eleven states have no current legislation 
regarding the policeman's right to join a union and 
bargain collectively, and twenty-four states have only 
implied rights in this matter. The authors indicate 
that a strong drive by a police "union" might cause 
these thirty-five states to reconsider their positions. 
In the past, studies have been made in the private 
sectors of the economy. The results have been used to 
^Hervey A. Juris and Kay B. Hutchison, "The Legal 
Status of Municipal Police Employee Organizations,1^ 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 23 (April, 
1970), p. 3^3>W. 
8 
suggest "new" ideas into the public sector. This study 
will make available to the private sector additional 
information on public sector experience with compulsory 
a rbit ration. 
This study could also have significance for the 
field of collective bargaining. As previously reported, 
eleven states have no legislation regarding the police¬ 
man's right to join a union and bargain collectively, 
and twenty-four states have implied rights in this 
matter. This study could have an impact on these states 
when they examine the experiences of other states. This 
does not mean that only police department collective 
bargaining would be affected. Other public sector 
employees such as teachers, nurses, garbage collectors, 
transit workers, among others, might be covered by 
state laws enacted as a result of the experiences 
encountered in Rhode Island and reported in this study. 
Students of collective bargaining would have 
another study to compare the impact that arbitration 




HISTORY AND GROWTH OF ARBITRATION 
According to Flemming, the American experience 
with labor arbitration is clearly divided into three 
periods.1 The first period extends from 1871 when the 
anthracite workers of Pennsylvania arbitrated disputes 
in the first recorded arbitration proceeding^ to the 
outset of World War II in 1941; the second period from 
1941 to the Lincoln Mills decision in 1957;^ and the 
third period includes those years from 1957 to the 
present. 
There are marked differences between these periods, 
.for the word "arbitration" lacks a common meaning; there 
are also marked similarities, and the arbitration 
machinery of today has deep roots in the past. Common 
themes run throughout the three periods--for example, 
outside pressures for arbitration in the "emergency" 
lR. W. Flemming, The Labor Arbitration Process 
(Illinois: University of Illinois Press, F56S), p. 1« 
2"Results of Arbitration Cases Involving Wages 
and Hours, 1865-1929", Monthly Labor Review, Volume 29, 
Number 1, 1929, pp. 14, 16. 
3lexti1e Workers Union v. L1nco1n Mills of 
A1 abama, 353 . S, 448 (T537). 
10 
situations and private efforts to develop a continuing 
mechanism for settling day-to-day disputes were just as 
prevalent in 1871 as they are in 1971. Beyond these 
generalities, a true perspective comes only with a more 
detailed examination of each of the periods.^ 
Three Periods of Arbitration 
The F ? rst Period 
The first known case in which an outside 
arbitrator was employed took place in 1871. The 
Committee of the Anthracite Board of Trade and the 
Committee of the Workingmen's Benevolent Association 
agreed to settle their disputes over "questions on 
interference with the works, and discharging men for 
their connection with the Workingmen's Benevolent 
Association" by referring the matter to Judge William 
Elwell of Bloornsburg, Pennsy 1 van i a . 5 The result was 
satisfactory to the parties involved. But in 137^, 
when the Ohio coal operators and the coal miner's union 
submitted their dispute to another judge for a decision, 
one company refused to accept the result and a strike 
occurred. Ultimately, the operators all conformed to 
^Flemming, Labor Arbit rat ? on, p. 1. 
Slbid. 
the desires of the dissenting company rather than to 
the arbitrator's award.^ 
As a general proposition, according to Flemming, 
Arbitration prior to the turn of the 
century, and even during the early 1900's, 
was thought of as a substitute for the strike 
in bringing about agreement over basic issues 
like wages ... It was, in fact, almost a 
truism of the period that strikes were dan¬ 
gerous and ineffective, did more harm than 
good, and should be supplanted by peaceful 
and intelligent methods for the settlement 
of the industrial disputes.7 
Interest in arbitration was furthered in the 
1890's through the work of an organization called the 
Congress of Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration. 
This organization included leaders from industry, labor, 
and government who were interested in promoting indus¬ 
trial harmony. In addition to these private efforts, 
there were pressures on state legislatures to establish 
such laws. In these states, the board's function was 
primarily one of mediation rather than arbitration as 
we now know it.^ 
One of the critical industries, the railroads, 
felt public pressure for the establishment of arbitra- 
6 I bi d. , p. 2. 
7 Ibid. 
8lbid p. 3. 
tion machinery in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. The great railway strikes of the 1870's and 
1880's brought about the introduction of bills in 
Congress for conciliation and arbitration. The first 
federal law, the Arbitration Act of 1888, was ineffective. 
No proceedings were initiated under it except that a 
commission of three members was formed by the President 
to report on the Pullman strike.^ 
The Arbitration Act was replaced by the Erdman 
Act in 1898. This act also proved to be ineffective 
during the early years because the carriers were opposed 
to intervention. By 1906, the unions had grown stronger, 
and in the period from 1906 to 1913, sixty-one contro¬ 
versies were settled, six of them by arbitration, and 
not a single important strike occurred affecting the 
operation of the trains.^ , 
In 1913, the Newlands Act, which created a Board 
of Mediation and Conciliation with four full-time 
members, was passed when a deadlock developed over the 
composition of arbitration boards under the Erdman Act. 
^Harry A. Mi 11 is and Royal E. Montgomery, 
Organized Labor (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Inc., 197+"5T7Tp. 730-731. 
101bicl. . p. 731. 
13 
This Board worked successfully until 1916, when the 
employees, who were dissatisfied with some previous 
awards, refused to submit their demands for an eight- 
hour day to arbitration. A nationwide strike was 
averted only by passage of the Adamson Act two days 
before the strike was to take place.^ This act pro¬ 
vided for the basic eight-hour day, but payment for 
overtime was to be at pro-rata rates, rather than time 
and one-half, as the employees had requested. It also 
provided for the appointment of a three member com¬ 
mission to study the operation and effects of the eight- 
hour day, and to report its findings to the President 
and Congress. 
During this time period, Congress deliberated 
over the passage of a compulsory arbitration law. 
However, changes did not come until 1926. In that year, 
Congress passed the Railway Labor Act, which established 
a five man Board of Mediation similar to the one provided 
under the Newlands Act. A distinction was made between 
disputes arising out of interpretation and application 
of the agreement and those having to do with changes in 
rates of pay rules, or working conditions. For a time 
this act worked well, but the Depression of the 1930's 
»1 Ibid., pp. 732-73'*. 
14 
brought about an accumulation of unsettled disputes and 
grievances which caused further amendments in 1934. 
Since then, the Railway Labor Act has remained sub¬ 
stantially the same.^ 
While Congressional efforts to achieve agreement 
at the national level failed, continuing progress was 
made in more limited private areas. Arbitration was 
becoming increasingly popular in labor-management 
relationships. The Arbitration Society of America was 
formed in 1922 and the American Arbitration Association 
in 1926. The example of the use of arbitration in 
commercial affairs doubtlessly served to popularize the 
method, particularly among lawyers and businessmen.^ 
Just prior to the 1929 economic depression, union 
membership was estimated at only 3.4 million.^ This 
figure represented a decline of more than 1,500,000 
members since V/orld War I. Furthermore, this period 
was the first time that the unions had failed to gain 
in a time of prosperity. 
121bid., pp. 738-740. 
13Emil Edwin Witte, Historical Survey of Labor 
Arbit ra tion (Phi1ade1phia: University of rennsyI vania, 
I952), p. 5. 
^ I 
,4Flemming, Labor Arbit ration, p. 12. 
15 
The passage of the V/agner Act in 1935 changed the 
situation. The question of national policy with regard 
to union recognition about which there had always been 
so much dispute was now settled. However, it was 1937 
before the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality 
of the We gner Act i n the- Jones and Laugh 1 i n case. ^ 
Henceforth, national policy favored collective bargain- 
i ng. 
By 1939 union membership was estimated at over 
eight million and by the end of V/orld V/ar II at sixteen 
mi 11 ion.16 Hundreds of new contracts, some of them 
hastily worded, were drawn up. The immediate result 
was to raise questions of interpretation and application 
and, upon cecoming deadlocked, the parties often turned 
to arbitration. A’though there were no reliable esti- 
~ates as to the use of arbitration prior to 19^0, it 
was estimated that fewer than eight to ten per cent of 
the agreements in effect during the 1930's provided for 
arb'trat'o^ of grievances as the final step in the 
IfhLftB /. Jones 5- Lauqhlin Steel Co., 301 
t.s. i (1W). 
,C/Kilton Derber, "Growth and Expansion," in Labor 
b'd tre v»ev/ Pea 1, ed. 1/ Milton Derber and Edwin Young 
(Hadison: university of Wisconsin Press, 1957), p. 5. 
16 
collective bargaining procedure.^ By 1941 the United 
States Conciliation Service found such clauses in sixty- 
two per cent of the twelve hundred agreements in its 
files.'8 
The Second Pe r ? od 
When the nation entered World War II, industrial 
disputes could no longer be tolerated. Accordingly, 
labor and management accepted President Roosevelt's 
request for a no-strike, no-lockout agreement and a 
tripartite V/ar Labor Board was established. Throughout 
the war, the War Labor Board vigorously supported the 
utilization of existing voluntary arbitration proce¬ 
dures and promoted the inclusion of grievance arbitra¬ 
tion provisions in those contracts which did not already 
contain it. Under the V/age Stabilization Act of 1942, 
free collective bargaining was limited by the requirement 
that the government approve wage and related matters. 
This Act made it impossible for the Board to give 
approval to arbitration awards which affected wages, 
but the Board nevertheless attempted to work out an 
^Sumner H. Slichter, James J. Healy, and E. 
Robert Livernash, The impact of Col 1ect ? ve Bargain ? ng 
on Management (Wash i ngton, (J.tTT: The Brookings 
TiTst i tute, T"960), p. 739. 
18p 1 ernmi ng, Labor Arbitrat ion, p. 13. 
17 
accomodation. 
The importance of the War Labor Board's attitude 
toward grievance arbitration is underlined if one looks 
again at the state of union organization in 1941. The 
passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, and the ruling that 
it was constitutional in 1937, caused many corporations 
like General Motors, U.S. Rubber, Jones and Laughlin, 
and General Electric to accept collective bargaining. 
But others such as Ford, Goodyear, Westinghouse, and 
Swift did not sign agreements until 1941.^9 The 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the H.J_. He i nz 
case, requiring collective agreements to be put in the 
form of signed v/ritten contracts, caused a change in 
attitude in many quarters.^ 
Just before the passage of the Wagner Act, union 
membership was approximately three million members. By 
1939 there we re eight to nine million members, and by 
1945 the figure had increased to between thirteen and 
fourteen million. Ten years later, in 1955, the figure 
was approximately sixteen to seventeen million. 1 The 
l^Derber, Labor and the New Pea 1, p. 12. 
20H.J. Heinz Co. V. Ml.KB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941) 
2‘Berber, Labor a rid the New Pea 1 , p. 3. 
18 
number of collective bargaining contracts naturally 
increased, as did the number of contracts including an 
arbitration clause. By 1944 the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reported finding grievance arbitration 
provisions in seventy-three per cent of the agreements 
in its file. The figure increased to eighty-three per 
cent in 1949 and to ninety-four per cent in 1960-1961. 
The War Labor Board ceased to exist shortly after 
the war ended in 1945. Had grievance arbitration been 
proven unsatisfactory, one might have expected that it 
would be dropped from the many contracts that had 
adopted its use during the war. As the previous 
statistics indicate, this did not occur. 
In retrospect, it is clear that World War II had 
'three effects insofar as voluntary arbitration is 
concerned. First, it encouraged widespread adoption of 
arbitration techniques. Second, the War Labor Board 
served as a training ground for the men who subsequently 
served as arbitrators. Third, it sharpened the distinc¬ 
tion between arbitration over rights and interests. 
According to Wortman, arbitration of rights is grievance 
22U.S., Department of Labor, "U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics-Major Collective Bargaining Agreements: 
Grievance Procedures", Bulletin No. 1H25- 1 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 1. 
19 
arbitration, in which the' arbitrator interprets the 
contracts which have already been negotiated, and 
arbitration of interests is contract arbitration in 
which the impartial umpire decides the unresolved 
issues for the parties.^3 
With this distinction came the opinion that con¬ 
tract, or interest arbitration, was of lesser importance 
than rights arbitration.^ Interest arbitration is 
concerned with the submission of a collective bargaining 
issue which they have been unable to settle themselves 
by an employer and a union to an impartial outsider. 
Gregory has suggested that the compulsory arbitration 
of interests "should be called "compulsory collective 
bargaining' rather than arbitration."^5 
According to Gregory, this submission of contract 
issues is not arbitration at all because the neutral 
person hearing the case has no recognized standards to 
23C. Wilson Randle and Max S. Wortman, Jr., 
Col 1ective Ba rqa1ninq (2nd ed.; Boston, Mass.: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), pp. 256-257. 
2^See for instance: Charles 0. Gregory, Labor 
and the Law (2nd ed.; New York: W.W. Norton 6- 
Company, Inc., 1961), p. 477; and Irving Bernstein, 
"Arbitration" in Industrial Conflict, eds. Arthur 
Kornhauser, Robert Dubin, and Arthur Ross (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1954), p. 302. 
^Gregory, Labor and the Law, p. 477. 
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guide his deliberations and influence his conclusions.^ 
When the issue is a wage increase, the parties may 
« 
submit evidence of advances in the cost of living index. 
They may show what wage rates prevail in similar in¬ 
dustries operating under simi 1 ar conditions, and what 
the trend of wage increases has been among the particu¬ 
lar employer's competitors. Also, testimony may be 
offered in connection with the employer's business 
prospects and his ability to pay the union requests or 
to pay any increase at all. 
Regardless of how formally and scientifically all 
such evidence is prepared and submitted at the hearing, 
it is not much help to the arbitrator. It is almost as 
speculative as considering what might have ensued had 
the union chosen to strike. This so-called economic 
evidence gives the arbitrator some facts to consider, 
but it furnishes only the roughest of guides.27 
This belief of an absence of definite principles 
or standards to govern the decision is not entirely 
justified,28 according to Elkouri. There are a number 
1bid . , p. 478. 
27 Ibid. 
2&Frank Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (Washington, 
D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1952), p. 22. 
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of standards which, while not as adequate as may be 
desired, are available and applied in the arbitration 
of interest disputes. Four of these standards are as 
fol1ows:29 . 
(1) Prevailing Practice - Industry, Area, 
I ndust rv-Area 
In giving effect to the prevailing practice, 
an arbitrator relies upon precedent, adopting 
for the parties that which has been adopted 
by other parties through collective bargain¬ 
ing, or, as sometimes is the case, as a result 
of arbitration awards. An award based upon 
application of this standard is not likely to 
be too far from the expectations of the 
parties, since most persons in the business 
community have long accepted the idea that 
there should be no basic inequalities among 
comparable individuals or groups. 
(2) Cost of Living 
The cost-of-living standard is frequently 
advanced in collective bargaining and arbi¬ 
tration during periods characterized by 
pronounced changes in 1iving- costs. in 
applying the cost-of-living standard, 
arbitrators rely heavily upon the index issued 
monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of 
the United States Department of Labor. This 
index reflects the cost of Living as of a 
date about six weeks prior to its issuance. 
By use of the index it is possible to measure 
changes in retail costs of services and 
commodities and the resulting effect upon the 
purchasing power of the income of workers in 
29For a complete listing see Elkouri, How 
Arb ? t rat ? on V/orks, pp. 99-129. 
• y 301bid p. 95. 
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the larger citi-es.^' 
(3) Ability to Pay 
Although it is a generally recognized princi¬ 
ple that large profits do not alone justify 
demands for wages substantially higher than 
those which are standard within an industry, 
and that small profits do not justify the 
payment of substandard wages, the ability-to- 
pay criterion is of great importance in the 
determination of wage-rates and other contract 
benefits.32 This importance lies in the fact 
that, while an employer's ability to pay is 
not, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for 
a change in wages, it is a significant element 
properly to be taken into account in 
determining the weight to be attached to 
other criteria.33 
(4) Pub 1ic 1nterest 
The question arises as to how far arbitrators 
should go in considering the pub 1ic-interest 
aspects of 'interest' disputes. The public, 
although not a direct party, has a vital 
interest in the settlement of some disputes. 
Fact-finding boards do give strong considera¬ 
tion to the public welfare in making recommen¬ 
dations. It is in respect to public utility 
disputes that the pub 1ic-interest criteria 
are most often invoked. Two considerations 
are generally involved. The first is that 
services of public utilities, being constantly 
consumed necessities of life, should be made 
available to consumers at a fair price. Since 
wages paid by a utility will directly affect 
the cost of its services to the public, the 
amount of any wage increase granted might be 
31 Ibid., p. 95. 
32See for instance: Third Avenue T ransit Corp. 
et al., 1 LA 321 (1946); Genera1 Motors Corp., 1 LA 
125 (1946); Internationa1 Harvester Co., 1 LA 512 (1946). 
33E1kou ri, How Arbit ration Works, p. 111. 
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affected by the arbitrator's conclusion as to 
the probable effect of the increase upon the 
price of the service involved. The arbitrator 
will keep in mind the needs of the consumer. 
The second consideration, which has been 
assuming increasing importance in recent 
years, recognizes that the public has a para¬ 
mount interest in continuity of operations of 
public utilities. The public expects utilities 
to provide uninterrupted service. Some states 
have enacted legislation to prevent strikes 
by public utility employees. Even before the 
passage of such laws, however, most public- 
utility labor had come to recognize that its 
responsibility to the public required 
uninterrupted services.^1- 
In addition, Bernstein states that a high incidence 
of the utilization of interest arbitration in the public 
sector stems from a recognition by both management and 
unions that contract arbitration, despite inherent 
limitations, is preferable to the stoppage of a vital 
service.35 
In the years between \9k\ and 1957 it became clear 
that arbitration was not only a device for settling 
differences of opinion over the meaning and interpreta¬ 
tion of contracts, but was also a device for settling 
differences of opinion over the content of contracts as 
we 11. Arbitration in this period was related to 
bargaining strategy, to human relations within the 
3^Ibid., pp. 126-127. 
^SBernstcin, "Arbitration", p. 303. 
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plant, and to organizational imperatives within the 
management and union structures. It was less concerned 
with the law, and is what distinguishes the next 
period--after 1957--from the other two. 
The Third Period 
When the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947, it 
included the following important Section 301. Sub¬ 
section (a) states: 
Suits for violation of contracts between 
an employer and a labor organization represent¬ 
ing employees in an industry affecting commerce 
as defined in this Act, or between any such labor 
organizations, may be brought in any district 
court of the United States having jurisdiction 
of the parties, without respect to the amount in 
controversy or without regard to the citizenship 
of the parties,^0 
According to Wortman, "this section obviously 
applies to disputes which arise concerning arbitrability 
or the obligation to arbitrate a particular dispute. 
In 1937, the Supreme Court decided in the Lincoln Mills^? 
case that arbitration clauses in contracts were enforce¬ 
able in the federal court system and that interpretation 
of the contract was to be effected in the light of 
36Scct.ion 301 (a), Labor-Management 
Act of 1947. 
3/Text ile Workers' Union v. I Incoln 
Alabama," T5T "U‘; STWTl 93777* 




Since this decision was difficult to interpret, 
arbitrators were unclear as to what the courts meant by 
this decision. Three years after Lincoln Mills, in 
June of I960, the Supreme Court decided three Steel¬ 
workers cases, popularly known as the Trilogy.39 
Arbitrability (the question of whether the contract 
required the parties to arbitrate a given issue) had 
been troublesome, for despite the contractual commitment 
to arbitrate, one party might refuse to submit a given 
issue on the grounds that the contract did not require 
it to do so. The Trilogy terminated this as the court 
stated: 
In the absence of any express provision 
excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, 
we think only the most forceful evidence of a 
purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration 
can prevail, particularly where, as here, the 
exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration 
clause quite broad. Since any attempt by a 
court to infer such a purpose necessarily 
comprehends the merits, the court should view 
with suspicion an attempt to persuade it to 
become entangled in the construction of the 
33Randle and Wortman, Co 11ective Barqaininq, p. 258 
39Un ? ted Steel workers of Ame rica v. Warrior & 
Gulf Navigation Co., ‘363 U.S. 57^ (i960); Un ited Steel - 
workers of AmieTica v. Enterpr ? se Whee 1 &• Car CorporatTon, 
36T" 0TS\ 593 (I960); United States S teeTwcTFke rs of 
America v. American Manuf act u r i ng Co., 363 U . ST 5*64 
TTWor: ~ 
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substantive provisions of a labor agreement, 
even though the back door of interpreting the 
arbitration clause, when the alternative is 
to utilize the services of an arbitrator.^ 
In another of the Trilogy cases, the court gave 
strong support to the power of arbitrators to create 
remedies. After noting that "the question of inter¬ 
pretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a 
question for the arbitrator" and "the courts have no 
business overruling him because their interpretation of 
the contract is different from his," ^ the court stated: 
When an arbitrator is commissioned to 
interpret and apply the collective bargaining 
agreement, he is to bring his informed judgement 
to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a 
problem. This is especially true when it comes 
to formulating remedies. There the need is for 
flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situa¬ 
tions. The draftsmen may never nave thought of 
what specific remedy should be awarded to meet a 
particular contingency. ’Nevertheless, an 
arbitrator is confined to interpretation and 
application of the collective bargaining agree¬ 
ment; he does not sit to dispense his own brand 
of industrial justice. He may of course look for 
guidance from many sources, yet his award is 
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence 
from the collective bargaining agreement. When 
the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to 
this obligation, courts have no choice but to 
^OlJn i ted $ tee 1 worke rs of Ame r i ca v. Warrior & 
Gu 1 f NavTgat i on Co" 363 U. S. 57^ 0 960). 
^Flemming, Labor Arbit rat ?on, p. 25. 
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refuse enforcement of the award.^ 
The effect of the Trilogy was to enhance the 
power and prestige of the arbitration process. Court 
decisions have not changed the fact that grievance 
arbitration is basically a private system of juris¬ 
prudence. However, these decisions have stated that 
contractual agreements to arbitrate, as well as awards, 
are no longer mere gentlemen's agreements, but are 
enforceable by order of the court. 
One other use for arbitration has emerged in the 
period between 1957 and the present. On January 17, 
1962, President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10988 
which was designed to encourage recognition of and 
bargaining with unions in the federal service.^ Under 
the’order, a union which represents the majority of the 
employees in an appropriate.unit, is entitled to 
exclusive recognition. Because disputes may arise as 
to what is the appropriate unit, or over whether tfie 
union does represent a majority of the employees, 
arbitrators drawn from the panel maintained by the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, may be 
^2United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Corp. 363“U.S'. 593 (I960). 
4327 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962). 
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nominated by the Secretary of Labor to resolve those 
questions.^ Further discussion of this subject will 
be found later in the following chapter. 
Experiences With Arbitration 
Se1ected Ame rican Expe r ? ences 
The Railway Labor Act provides the framework for 
the most comprehensive control of labor relations and 
labor disputes on the American railroad scene, and the 
most detailed experience with fact finding procedure. 
This Act came about as a result of dissatisfaction with 
the then existing governmental intervention machinery 
which followed governmental operation of the railroad 
during World War I. This Act made it the duty of the 
parties to exert every reasonable effort to "make and 
maintain agreements concerning rates of pay and working 
conditions," and to attempt to adjust all differences 
by peaceful methods.^5 
A five-man, nonpartisan Board of Mediation was 
created, which attempted mediation if the'parties could 
not agree among themselves. The Board was further 
^Flemming, Labor Arbi t rat ion, pp. 28-29. 
^Herbert R. Northrup, Compu 1 sory Arb i t rat ?on and 
Government Intervention 1n Labor Disputes (Washington, 
D. C.: Labor Policy Association, 1 nc. , I~966), p. 52. 
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instructed to urge voluntary arbitration if mediation 
proved unsuccessful. If arbitration was refused and 
i 
the dispute was such as to interrupt interstate commerce, 
the Board of Mediation was instructed to notify the 
President, who could create special emergency boards to 
investigate and publish findings. During the time 
period between these various proceedings and the thirty 
days after the report of the emergency board, neither 
party was to alter the conditions out of which the 
dispute arose except by mutual agreement. The parties, 
however, were under no legal obligation to accept the 
recommendations of the emergency board. 
The period from 1926 to 1934, during which rai1- 
way labor relations were conducted under the 1926 
legislation, was relatively peaceful. Only two strikes 
occurred. Although ten emergency boards were appointed, 
half of these were set up during the last year of the 
Act's operation. The increased threats to railway 
labor peace during the last year of the Act have been 
attributed by Kaltenborn to inherent defects in the 
legislation.^ 
461bid. 
wH. S. Kaltenborn, Government Adjustment of Labor 
Disputes (Chicago: Foundation Press, 1943), p7 52. 
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Whatever its merits, the 1926 Act was found de¬ 
fective by the railway unions on several counts. They 
desired national adjustment boards with effective 
machinery for breaking deadlocks and for enforcing 
awards; specific penalties, in addition to the injunc¬ 
tive process, to prevent•carrier1s influence over the 
choice of employee's representatives; formal machinery 
by which bargaining agents could be selected; and 
drastic changes in personnel of the Board of Mediation, 
which had fallen from their favor. All these objectives 
were achieved by the 1934 amendments to the Railway 
Labor Act.**® 
The amended Railway Labor Act maintains the basic 
structure of the 1926 legislation insofar as mediation, 
arbitration, and the appointment of emergency boards 
are concerned. The main difference in this respect is 
that the five-man Board of Mediation was abolished and 
replaced by a three-man National Mediation Board. The 
1934 amendments established the National Railroad 
Adjustment Board, which had jurisdiction over grievances 
and disputes arising out of the interpretation of agree¬ 
ments. The amendments also provided elaborate safe¬ 
guards for the free choice of employee representatives 
^Northrup, Compulsory Arbitration, p. 53. 
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by setting forth a list of unfair labor practices similar 
to those contained in the Wagner Act. 
As a comprehensive code of labor legislation for 
railroads, the Railway Labor Act: (1) established 
definite provisions for the conduct of negotiations and 
provided for the postponement of strikes or lockouts 
until a variety of government intervention techniques 
have occurred; (2) provided for compulsory arbitration 
of grievance disputes before a national, publicly 
supported bipartisan board; (3) provided for a method 
of selecting bargaining representatives and proscribed 
employer unfair labor practices; and (4) applied the 
principles and practices of the Act which were developed 
in the railroad industry to a new industry--air trans¬ 
portation. ^9 
With respect to compulsory arbitration, the 
government outlawed railroad strikes in the years 1963, 
1967, and 1970. In so doing, a precedent was estab¬ 
lished that may be followed in the future. According 
to Taylor and Witney: 
Whether or not the carriers and the 
organizations like it or not, whether or not 
the true public interest is promoted by this 
policy, the cold and inexorable fact is that 
from this time forward the federal government 
• > 49 Ibid pp. 5^-55. 
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will not permit national railway strikes. The 
carriers and organizations must understand this 
and base their future actions on the basis of 
this incontrovertible proposition. No longer 
will the threat of a strike or lockout serve to 
stimulate and induce the parties to reach a 
settlement in genuine and good-faith collective 
bargaining. The government has removed the 
threat from the picture, and future policies 
and behavior of the carriers and the union 
organization will take this into account.50 
In effect, what has happened in the railroad 
industry is that once the parties understood that the 
government would not tolerate a national railroad work 
stoppage, there was no realistic collective bargaining. 
The parties do meet and discuss issues but once they 
understand that there will be no strike or lockout, 
they make no serious attempt to reach a settlement. 
This raises two basic questions: (1) Why should the 
parties bargain realistically when they are fully aware 
that failure to reach a settlement would not result in 
economic sanctions? and (2) Why should they make any 
genuine and serious effort to resolve their differences 
when they are aware that making concessions would serve 
to weaken their position in the eventual arbitration?51 
^^Benjarnin J. Taylor and Fred Witney, Labor 
Relations Law (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), 
pp. 455-6. 
^Taylor and Witney, Labor Re 1 at ions Law, p. 456. 
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Another experience with compulsory arbitration 
occurred when the legislature in Kansas passed the 
i 
Industrial Court Act in January, 1920. This Act was 
passed in response to a coal strike in 1919, which 
limited the coai supply just as winter began. Many 
schools and industrial plants were forced to close for 
lack of fuel. The object of the Act was to protect the 
public against organized oppression, to safeguard 
liberty, to settle differences on their merits, and to 
maintain industrial peace.52 This legislation applied 
only to specified essential industries. According to 
Mi 11 is and Montgomery, these industries were:^ 
(1) the manufacture or preparation of food pro¬ 
duct s; 
(2) the manufacture of clothing; 
* 
(3) the mining or production of any substance or 
material in common use as fuel; 
(A) the transportation of any and all of the 
above; and 
(5) all public utilities and all common carriers. 
Since arbitration with representatives of both 
parties participating was regarded as undesirable by 
the legislature, the law provided for the settling of 
^Millis and Montgomery, Organized Labor, p. 823. 
53|bid. 
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disputes by a Court of Industrial Relations consisting 
of three neutral parties. 
A considerable number of cases were decided 
satisfactorily by the Court, and an unknown number of 
strikes prevented. There were also a number of situa¬ 
tions in which the Court- proved to be ineffective. An 
example was the spontaneous walkout of a majority of 
miners in a district that left the Court at a loss as 
to how to proceed. It could not take any action against 
any union since the walkout was a voluntary individual 
matter.^4 
Even though many persons and organizations were 
receptive to compulsory arbitration, the Supreme Court 
of the United States declared this Act unconstitutional 
on the grounds that it sought to compel owner and 
employees to continue in business on terms not of their 
own making. This infringed upon the rights of property 
and liberty of contract guaranteed by. the due process 
of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.^5 
The Fore 1qn Expe r ? ence--Aust ra1ia 
In addition to the compulsory arbitration 
5^Ibid., p. 826. 
55|bid., p. 827. 
y 
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situation as it exists in the experiences mentioned 
above, it should be noted that Australia has had 
experience with this type of dispute settling tech- 
niques. 
Since the passage of the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1904, Australian 
labor unions have been under a form of public control 
arid regulation. Under this Act, a registered union was 
given a virtual monopoly in its trade or industry to 
represent workers during collective bargaining pro¬ 
cesses. The chief objective of the Act was to . 
encourage the organization of representative bodies of 
employers and employees and their registration under 
the Act.Since the jurisdiction of the Court has 
been interpreted very liberally, practically all 
national labor unions have found it advantageous to 
register under it.^7 
Under the Commonwealth machinery, the strike or 
lockout is illegal once a union is registered. Strikes 
still rema i n a frequent occurrence arid have been 
5°D. W. Oxnam, "Industrial Arbitration in 
Australia: Its Effects on Wages and Unions," Industrial 
and Labor Re 1 at ions Rev 1 ew, Vol . 9 (July, 1956)^ p~! 615. 
57Northrup, Compulsory Arbitration, p. 37. 
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increasing at a rapid rate. In 1959, Sharp wrote: 
The number of disputes per year since 1950 
has been mainly in the excess of ‘the number in 
years prior to that date, and has been consider¬ 
ably higher than the pre-war level, even allowing 
for population growth and increase in industrial 
establishments. Furthermore, whatever decline 
there has been in the number of disputes has 
occurred almost entirely in the coal mining 
industry. If that industry, which has been under 
particular economic stress in recent years, is 
excluded, it becomes clear, beyond doubt, that 
the number of disputes has been increasing quite 
sha rp1y. 
In 1963, the number of strikes in most major 
groupings increased over the previous year and again in 
1964 the statistics show that there was a considerable 
increase in the level of industrial disputes over the 
previous year.59 
There are two possible explanations for the rapid 
rate of increase in these disputes. First, in past 
years a number of key unions were dominated by left-wing 
or Communist elements and either refused to register, 
or paid no heed to registration obligations. These 
unions have been concentrated in mining and longshore, 
5^'lan Sharp, "Some Features of the Australian 
Industrial Relations Scene," The Jou rna1 of Indust rial 
Relations, Vol. 1 (April, 1959), p. 5. 
59j. R. Kerr, "Industrial Relations 1963-1964," 
The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 6 (November, 
T554TTppT“ l TJ-T74T 
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which, in Australia as in many other countries, have had 
a record of frequent industrial stoppages.^0 
A second reason for the poor strike record in 
Australia is the lack of effective local or national 
union leadership and organization. With a union 
movement heavily dependent upon government and politi¬ 
cal support, with the most able union leaders siphoned 
into political work, and with the experience that 
disputes will come before a government board anyway, 
there is little incentive to attract promising persons 
into local union activity and even less incentive to 
settle at the local level. The failure of the 
Australian system to distinguish between disputes over 
new agreements and disputes over grievances or contract 
interpretation aggravates this problem because it means 
that any significant dispute of either kind is likely 
to be decided by a government tribunal rather than at a 
bargaining session.^ 
In recent years, the separation of the national 
union leadership from the rank and file has become 
60Arthur M. Ross and Paul T. Hartman, Chang ? nq 
Patterns of Industria 1 Conf1 1ct (New York: John Wlley 
Sr Sons, Inc.l 19& 0), pp~ 147-148. 
^Northrup, Compu 1 sory Arb ? t rat ? on, p. 40. 
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almost formalized by the' creation of local shop 
councils to handle local union work. These have been 
condemned as Communist-inspired by top union leadership, 
but apparently are not always so. The councils have 
constituted a challenge to the union "establishment" by 
taking strike action without union approval.82 
The interest of the rank and file in shop councils 
indicates the remoteness of dispute settlement in 
Australia from the union member. While strike action 
is still something in which the rank and file of unions 
generally have a direct part, the settlement of.griev¬ 
ances and the termination of disputes through the 
public machinery of conciliation and arbitration has 
become dependent not on rank and file judgement and 
action, but on the services of specialists in that 
field, be they union officials, industrial advocates, 
or barristers. 
Compulsory arbitration has had a profound influ¬ 
ence on trade union development in Australia. Compulsory 
arbitration induces the unorganized employees to 
organize, and the employers to negotiate before an 
arbitration tribunal is established. Australia has 
82kerr, "Industrial Relations," pp. 173-175. 
83Sharp, Features of Australian Scene, p. 3. 
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become one of the most highly unionized countries in 
the western world, but union organization at the local 
level has been neglected in the process. Today, more 
than sixty per cent of the employed labor force is in 
trade unions, largely because of the artificial 
creation of the arbitration system. The system has 
enhanced union power, but has made it utterly dependent 
CL 
on government. H 
There is some indication that the trade unions 
are growing restless under the regulations imposed upon 
them. For example, the president of the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions advised visiting students from 
Asian countries, "Don't allow your workers' organiza¬ 
tions to become shackled as we have become in Australia, 
through too much legalizing of the system."^5 
As to the effect on collective bargaining, all 
evidence points to the tendency to paralyze the 
propensity to settle and to bring to the arbitration 
courts a myriad of disputes which under a freer bar¬ 
gaining system would be settled by the parties 
6^Northrup, Compulsory Arbitration, p. 43. 
65L. S. Merrifield, "Regulations of Union 
E1ections in Austra1ia," Indust rial and Labor Re 1 ations 
Review, Vol. 10 (January, 1937), pT 2o3. 
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themselves. In recent years, the red tape delays and 
tangled legalistic approach have induced a few indus- 
tries and unions to settle their own disputes. 
According to Northrup, 
There can be no doubt that the Australian 
arbitration system has not succeeded in 
eliminating strikes or lockouts. It may have 
shortened strikes, but it certainly has increased 
their numbers. Anyone who believes that the 
existence of a compulsory arbitration system 
will either curb unionism or wi11 eliminate or 
reduce the number of strikes would be well 
advised to make a realistic study of the 
Australian experience.°7 
According to V/alker, the Australian compulsory 
arbitration has certain built-in rigidities: 
On a rising market arbitration prevents 
the workers from obtaining full advantage of 
their economic pov/er due to the keen demand 
for labor. On a falling market, arbitration 
obstructs employers from obtaining the full 
advantages of their economic power due to the 
scarcity of jobs and the weakness of trade 
unions through abnormal unemployment.^ 
There seems to be general agreement that these 
rigidities exist in Australia and that another effect 
has been to narrow skill differentials so that the 
66(\j0rthrup, Compu 1 sory Arb i t rat ion, p. 43. 
6?lbid., p. 44. 
F. V/alker, Industrial Relations in 
Aust ra1ia (Cambridge, Mass.: Rarvard University 
Press, 1956), p. 4. 
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unskilled are over-priced relative to the skilled. 
Such a regidity reduces the incentive to progress up 
the occupational ladder. 
Finally, there has been some criticism of the 
role of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court's wage 
determination policy and national economic policy. 
Because of the nature of the Court's powers it is 
invariably involved in general reviews of the state of 
the national economy. Yet the Court appears to conduct 
its operations outside the framework of general economic 
policy and without channels of communication between it 
and policy-making agencies. 
Summa ry 
Labor arbitration in the United States is divided 
into three periods. The first period-began in 1871 
with the first known case in which an outside umpire 
was employed. In the 1890's, arbitration advanced 
through the work of an organization called the Congress 
of Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration. The 
primary function of this board was one of mediation 
rather than arbitration as we know it today. Arbitra¬ 
tion advanced further in the 1920's when the American 
Arbitration Association was formed. This period ended 
^^Northrup, Compulsory Arbitration, p. 44. 
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when the United States entered World War II. 
The years between 1941 and 1957, the second 
period, made it clear that grievance arbitration was 
not only a device for settling differences of opinion 
over the meaning and interpretation of contracts, but 
was also related to bargaining strategy, to human 
relations within the plant, and to organizationa1 
imperatives 'within the management and union structures. 
The start of the third period was in the year 
1957 when the Supreme Court decided in the L. i ncol n Mills 
case that arbitration clauses in contracts were enforce¬ 
able in the federal court system. Other landmark cases 
in this period were those included in the Steelworkers 
Trilogy. In addition to these court decisions, 
President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10938, which 
was designed to encourage recognition of and bargaining 
with unions in the federal service. 
Experiences with compulsory arbitration discussed 
in this chapter include both American and foreign. The 
selected American experiences are the railroad industry 
and the Industrial Court Act passed in Kansas. The 
Australian experience with compulsory arbitration began 
with the passage of the Commonwealth Court of Concilia¬ 
tion and Arbitration Act of 1904. Since that date, 
Australian labor unions have been under a form of public 




PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 
UNIONIZATION, AND ARBITRATION 
According to Taylor and Witney, the issue of 
public employee collective bargaining reached 
unprecedented proportions in the decade of the sixties. 
The changing composition of the labor force in the 
United States has brought with it a rapid rise'in 
government employment. In 1930 about six per cent of 
the civilian labor force was engaged in public employ¬ 
ment. By 1968 government employees constituted nearly 
seventeen per cent of the non-agricu1tura1 work forced 
At the close of that year, federal, state, and local 
governments employed a total of 12,202,000 workers.^ 
Government employment has more than doubled since 19^7, 
when it totaled 5,^7^-, 000.3 
In addition, Taylor and Witney reported that the 
greatest gains have been at the state and local level-- 
1 Benjamin J. Taylor and Fred Witney, Labor 
Relations Law (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
T97ITTp. 503. 
2Month!y Labor Review, Vol. XCI 1, No. 5 
(May 191790, p. 99. 
31bid. 
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not at the federal level, as is often mistakenly believed. 
About one-third of state and local employees are cur¬ 
rently associated with education. Over the twenty-one- 
year period,' federal employment rose by about fifty per 
cent while state and local employment increased nearly 
three hundred per cent. State and local employment in 
1968 accounted for 9,465,000 of the 12,202,000 govern¬ 
ment employees. If the current trend continued, nearly 
sixteen million persons will be employed by all levels 
of government by 1975.^ 
Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector 
In tracing the history of collective bargaining 
in the public sector, unionization of the federal 
employees reportedly existed as early as 1800 in naval 
yards. Cj In addition, wage rate negot rat i on. has occurred 
among various levels of TVA employees ranging from those 
classified as production workers through the professional 
ranks. Negotiations have been carried on despite the 
general understanding that wages are set by law. 
^Taylor and Witney, Labor Re 1 ations Law, p. 503. 
5H. Roberts, A Manua1 For Employee-Management 
Coope rating in the Fede ra1 Service (Hawaii: Indust rial 
Relations Center, University of Hawaii, 1964), p. 4. 
^Taylor and Witney, Labor Re 1 at ions Law, p. 505. 
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The first legislation with respect to federal 
policy toward employee organizations was the Pendleton 
Act (commonly known as the Civil Service Act), passed 
in 1883. Under this act, only Congress has the 
authority to regulate wages, hours and other terms and 
conditions of employment. 
In 1902 President Theodore Roosevelt banned 
federal employees from seeking beneficial legislation 
directly or indirectly through their associations. 
Benefits were to be obtained through the departments in 
which they were employed. A violation- of the order was 
grounds for dismissal.7 In 1906 President Roosevelt 
broadened this order and stated that: 
All officers and employees of the United 
States of every description, serving in or under 
any of the Executive Departments or independent 
Government establishments, and whether so serving 
in or out of 'Washington, are hereby forbidden, 
either directly or indirectly, individually or 
through associations, to solicit an increase of 
pay or to influence or attempt to influence in 
their own interest any other legislation what¬ 
ever, either before Congress or its Committees, 
or in any way save through the heads of the 
Departments or independent Government establish¬ 
ments, in or under which they serve, on penalty 
of dismissal from the Government service.0 
7Ster!ing Spero, Government as Empioyer (New 
York: Remsen Press, 1941377 p. 122. 
&Kurt L. Hans 1 owe, "The Emerging Law of Labor 
Relations in Public Employment," ILR Paperback No. 4 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: New York State School of Indust rial and 
Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1967), p. 35. 
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In 1912 Congress rejected this approach by passing 
the Lloyd-La Follette Act.^ This statute became the 
« 
basis for the principle that federal employees in 
general had the right to join any organization that 
did not assert the right to strike against the govern¬ 
ment.^ If a literal interpretation is made, the Act 
restricted protection of union membership to postal 
employees. Despite that fact, other empfoyees gained 
the right to organize on the basis of its language. 
However, the right to organize is of limited value if 
procedures are not provided to guarantee an effective 
collective bargaining process. 
In 1920 the government negotiated its first 
written labor agreement.^ This contract covered most 
of the construction workers on' the Alaskan railroad and 
proved to be an added impetus to federal employee bar¬ 
gaining. This progress was soon slowed by the Boston 
police strike at the local level which will be discussed 
later. 
95 U.S.C. 642 (1912). 
^Charles B. Craver, “Bargaining in the Federal 
Sector," Labor Law Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 9 (September, 
1968), p. 570. 
‘1 Taylor and V/itney, Labor Relations Law, p. 506. 
•2Craver, “Bargaining in the Federal Sector". 
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In the 1940's, another thrust was made by em¬ 
ployees in the public sector for Congress to establish 
a law that would not only give the unions the right to 
represent federal employees, but would also set up 
machinery to guarantee an effective collective bar¬ 
gaining process. This thrust culminated with the 
introduction of the Rhodes-Johnston Bill of 1949 which 
was a measure to protect the right of unions to represent 
federal employees.^3 11 failed to pass in that year 
and was debated over the next fourteen years until 
President Kennedy signed Executive Order No. 10938 into 
law in January, 1962. 
Until 1982 and the signing of E.0o 10988 the 
doctrine of sovereignty had been used by governmental 
bodies as a basis of denying the collective bargaining 
process to public employees. Sovereignty may be defined 
as the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by 
which any independent state is governed.^ In the 
United States, ultimate power reposes in the people but 
is exercised for them by their duly elected representa¬ 
tives. These representatives exercise sovereign power 
1 3W i Ison R. Hart, Col 1ective Ba rgaining ? n the 
Federa1 Civil Service (New York: Harper & Row, 
1 9 3 1 ), p“ 168 . 
l4jaylor and Witney, Labor Relations Law, p. 504. 
within the limits placed bn them by constitutions and 
statutes. Unionization of government workers was 
viewed as interference with sovereign authority because 
it could lead to joint determination of wages, hours, 
and terms and conditions of employment. Union attempts 
to take away or snare a sovereign power was therefore 
uni awful.15 
This attitude seemed to change when President 
Kennedy was elected in I960. As a senator, Kennedy had 
been involved in many unsuccessful attempts to pass the 
Rhodes-Johnston Bill. In 1961 he appointed a six- 
member task force to study the problem of employee- 
management relations in the federal service.^3 The 
group, headed by Arthur Goldberg, submitted its findings 
November 30, 1961, and reported in part: 
At the present time, the Federal 
.Government has no Presidential policy on 
employee-management relations, or at least 
no policy beyond the barest acknowledgements 
that such relations ought to exist. Lacking 
guidance, the various agencies of the 
government have proceeded on widely varying 
courses. Some have established extensive 
relations with employee organizations; most 
have done little; a number have done nothing. 
The Task Force is firmly of the opinion that 
in large areas of the Government we are yet 
15 I bid. 
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to take advantage of this means of enlisting 
the creative energies of Government workers 
in the formulation and implementation of 
policies that shape the conditions of their 
work.17 
The Task Force felt that it was improper for the 
government to fail to extend to its own employees the 
same privileges enjoyed by workers in private enter¬ 
prise as a result of federal action. It noted that 
responsible unions would strengthen and improve the 
1 R 
fede ra1 service. ° 
In January, 1962, President Kennedy responded to 
the report by issuing E.O. No. 10988 which established 
the basic framework within which collective bargaining 
was to take place in agencies under the executive branch 
of government. For the first time federal employees 
had the protected right to join unions and engage in 
collective bargaining with the federal agencies for 
whom they worked. These agencies under proper circum¬ 
stances must recognize and bargain collectively with 
unions representing government employees. The federal 
17Report of the President's Task Force on Employee- 
Management Relations in the Federal Service, _A Pol icy 
For Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal 
Serv i"ce [WalTh i nqtorf^ D*7C.: Government Printing Office, 
1WV p. i i i . 
l^Hanslowe, Erne rging Law of Labor Re la tions, 
pp. 39-40. 
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government has attempted to provide organizationa1 and 
bargaining rights for its employees in essentially the 
same way as these rights are established for employees 
in the private sector.^ 
After E.O. 10938 had been in effect for eight 
years, changes in the order we re necessary. In October, 
1969, President Nixon issued Executive Order No. 11491 
which substantially changed President Kennedy's order. 
Under the present order, exclusive recognition is now 
provided for unions representing federal employees. To 
gain exclusive recognition a union must be selected by 
a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit through 
a secret ballot election. Under E.O. 10938, unions were 
able to secure exclusive recognition by using signed 
union membership authorization cards. 
In another change, under the original order the 
Civil Service Commission and the various federal agencies 
were given the power to oversee and implement the policies 
and procedures contained in E.O. 10988. The new order 
creates a three-member Federal Labor Relations Council 
to administer the program, decide major policy matters, 
and issue rules and regulations. Also, the new order 
enables the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor- 
19Taylor and Witney, Labor Relations Law, p. 508. 
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Management Relations to have the authority to resolve 
disputes over the composition of bargaining units and 
representation rights, to order and supervise elections, 
and to disqualify unions from recognition because of 
corrupt or undemocratic influences. Formerly these 
matters were resolved by the particular federal agency 
and their final judgement was not subject to appeal.^ 
Without a doubt, unions in general have advanced 
to a prominent place in employee-employer relations in 
the public sector since the 1800's. In this general 
context, one specific segment of the public sector will 
be examined, namely, police departments. 
Police Labor Organization 
In the early 1900's, policemen in many parts of 
the country joined labor unions. Boston, Los Angeles, 
St. Paul, and Jersey City were among the thirty-seven 
cities in which policemen organized. Failure o\ wages 
to keep pace with the rising cost of living is the main 
reason given for the change in the policemen's attitude 
toward labor organizations. This movement into union¬ 
ization was not without difficulty. In Washington, when 
the policemen were ordered to resign from their union, 
20Ibid., p. 513. 
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they contested the decision in the courts. In Boston, 
when the police who were members of the Policemen's 
Union refused to resign, Police Commissioner Edwin V. 
Curtis announced a campaign to recruit a voluntary 
pol i c.e force. ^ 
Officers in the Boston Policemen's Union attempted 
to dispel the fear that their affiliation with the AFL 
would deter members from doing their duty. "The members 
of the Boston Policemen's Union intend to do their full 
duty as police officers in the future as in the past 
and retain their full membership in the American 
Federation of Labor." Commissioner Curtis then sus¬ 
pended nineteen officers of the union and this was the 
signal for a strike of 1500 policemen on September 11, 
1919. Without the police force, a twenty-four hour 
period of rioting, looting, and violence occurred. 
“On September 12, 1919, Governor Calvin Coolidge 
sent in 9,000 militiamen to keep order. By September 14, 
order had been partly restored. Samuel Gompers sought 
an end to the dispute by a compromise suggesting that 
the striking policemen return to work and that the 
21Phi1ip Taft, Organized Labor in American History 
(New York: Harper £■ Row, PubYi shers, i 9'ok) , p~^ 3>k6~. 
221bid. 
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suspensions be decided later. The Policemen's Union 
voted to accept this proposal, but Commissioner Curtis 
and the Governor found the proposal unacceptab1e. 
Neither the commissioner nor the governor would 
allow rehiring of strikers. The Central Labor Union 
found the time inopportune for calling a general strike, 
and the policemen decided not to contest their dis¬ 
missals in the courts. The calling of the Boston 
Strike and its defeat halted the growth of police 
unions. Many of those which existed were forced to 
dissolve on the threat of dismissal.^3 
Labor unions did not succeed in the police sector. 
The apparent reason for this was the public sentiment 
against the use of the word "union". What has seemingly 
been more popular throughout the police history has 
been fraternal and benevolent associations. These 
associations existed in the police service before the 
turn of the century. There are many local and state 
groups, some of which are affiliated for professional, 
educational, and legislative purposes. Local organiza¬ 
tions of this kind have two main objectives --to obtain 
better working conditions and salaries for police 
officers, and to provide a social outlet for officers 
231bid., p. 349. 
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with similar interests. The social aspect is fre¬ 
quently accompanied by educational and benevolent 
objectives including financial provision for families 
of officers who are disabled or die. 
The first major police organization was founded 
in 1915 and was named the Fraternal Order of Police 
(FOP). During the first twenty years of the organiza¬ 
tion's existence, membership did not increase 
significantly.^^4 At its inception, the FOP's original 
purposes were directed toward securing civil service 
protection and bolstering pension systems through 
lobbying. In time, local FOP lodges expanded their 
interests to all police monetary items and working 
conditions as well as emphasizing recreational facilities 
and activities.^5 
In the 1930's, the FOP began to grow.^ Today it 
is the largest national police employee organization 
and claims 90,000 members in forty-two states. The 
membership consists of policemen of all ranks as well 
24Specific data were not available from the FOP. 
. Joseph Loewenberg, "Policemen and Firemen," 
in Erne rq ? no Sectors of Col 1 ect i ve Ba rqa i n i nq, ed . by 
Seymour L. Wolf be in "("Massachusetts: D.H. Mark 
Publishing Company1970), pp. 145-6. 
2°Specific data were not available from the FOP. 
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as citizens in the local community who are known as 
associate members.^7 This organization does not 
i 
consider itself a labor union because it is not 
affiliated with the AFL-CIO. 
The FOP is the largest police labor organization 
in the state of Rhode Island. There is a lodge in 
every one of the thirty-nine cities and towns in the 
state as well as a state lodge to which the state police 
belong. Even though this organization is not considered 
to be a union by its memberszo (nor do they desire to 
be considered as a union), the FOP is the bargaining 
agent for thirty-two of the thirty-nine cities and 
towns. 
In addition to the FOP, there is a labor 
organization in Rhode Island which is a union and is 
known as such. This is the International Brotherhood 
of Police Officers which was started in 1954. The IBPO 
was founded in Cranston, Rhode Island by seven policemen 
who had been evicted from the FOP for strike activity. 
In the IBPO's seven-year history, it has become the 
bargaining agent in seven cities and/or towns even 
27 I bid. 
2®This fact was stated by the majority of inter- 
viewees in this study. 
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though a portion of the policemen in those communities 
still retain membership in the FOP. 
In 1970, the IBPO became affiliated with the 
National Association of Government Employees (NAGE), an 
independent union, and has now started to organize 
police officers in other states of the United States.^9 
As the bargaining agents for the policemen in the 
state, one of the functions that concerns each of these 
organizations is compulsory arbitration. 
Comparison of State .Compulsory 
Arbitration Statutes^ 
Since the first binding, compulsory arbitration 
statute covering employees in the public sector became 
law in Wyoming on May 22, 1965, five other states have 
met'the need for this type of legislation including: 
Pennsylvania (1968), Rhode Island (1968), Michigan (1969), 
Vermont (1970), and Hawaii (1970). Although Wyoming's 
law and Vermont's law cover only fire fighters, the 
other five cover all public employees. All of the 
29Although the word 'International' was in the 
title of this organization, this union was operated 
as a local. This action taken in 1970 was similar to 
a local affiliating with an international. 
^The information provided in this section was 
obtained from the statutes in each of the six states. 
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statutes are permanent except that of Michigan, which is 
an experimental lav; scheduled to expire on June 30, 1972 
(see Appendix A). 
Following is a list of the states that have 
enacted compulsory, binding arbitration concerned with 
police. They are listed according to the effective 
date of each law. The basic coverage of each statute 
is noted. 
Wyoming - Effective May 22, 1965 - The sole 
public employee bargaining law in 
V/yoming covers only fire fighters 
employed by any regularly constituted 
fire department in any city, town, or 
county and provides for binding, com¬ 
pulsory arbitration to resolve impasses 
arising in fire fighters' negotiations. 
Pennsylvania - Effective June 2.4, 1963 - Authorizes 
collective bargaining between policemen 
or firemen and their public employers, 
provides for arbitration, and requires 
compliance with co11ective bargaining 
agreements and findings of arbitrators. 
Rhode Island - Effective September, 1968 - There are 
five public employee bargaining statutes 
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in the State of Rhode Island. Separate 
laws cover state employees, municipal 
employees and teachers. In addition, 
two nearly identical statutes not only 
grant bargaining rights to firemen and 
policemen, but also provide for compul¬ 
sory, binding arbitration to resolve 
impasses in negotiations. 
M1chigan - Effective October 1, 19&9 - The compre¬ 
hensive Public Employment Relations Act 
in Michigan extends bargaining rights 
to all public employees except, as 
dictated by the constitution, those in 
the state classified service. An 
experimental law which will expire 
June 30, 1972, provides binding arbitra¬ 
tion to resolve impasses arising in 
police and firemen's negotiations. 
Vermont - Effective July 1, 1970 - The sole public 
employee bargaining law in Vermont 
covers only fire fighters employed by 
any regularly constituted fire 
department in any city, town, or county 
and provides for binding, compulsory 
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arbitration to resolve impasses arising 
in fire fighters' negotiations. 
Hawa ?i - Effective July 1, 1970 - The comprehen¬ 
sive bargaining statute in Hawaii covers 
• all public employees. This law grants 
the right of these employees to bargain 
collectively and provides for binding, 
compulsory arbitration to resolve impasses. 
Although these six statutes are concerned with 
binding, compulsory arbitration in the public sector, 
there are only two common factors in them all. First, 
each law provides that an award which is rendered by 
the majority of the compulsory arbitration board members 
dealing with police departments is binding on any and 
all parties. Second, each law provides for a compulsory 
arbitration board composed of three members. The board 
is established as follows: the bargaining agent and 
the corporate authority each select and name one 
arbitrator and immediately notify each other in writing 
of the name and address of the person selected. These 
two arbitrators then select and name a third arbitrator. 
Differences among the six statutes on a variety 
of subjects include: the selection of the neutral 
member of the compulsory arbitration board, the 
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determination of an impasse in negotiations, the payment 
of arbitration costs, and the appeal procedures of the 
awards. 
Se1ect ? on of Neut ra1 Arbit rator 
Since the management and union arbitrators are 
required to select the neutral arbitrator, the situation 
often arises in which they are unable to agree on the 
selection of the third member. In each of the six 
states, provisions have been made for the selection of 
the neutral arbitrator should such a situation occur. 
In Wyoming, the neutral will be selected by a dis¬ 
trict judge in the community; in Pennsylvania, the 
neutral will be chosen from a list of three names given 
to the parties by the American Arbitration Association; 
in Rhode Island, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
in Rhode Island wi11 appoint a Rhode Island resident; in 
Michigan, the Chairman of the Michigan Employment 
Relations Commission will select the neutral; in Vermont, 
the Commissioner of Labor and Industry will appoint the 
neutral; and in Hawaii, the Hawaiian Public Employment 
Relations Board will make the choice of the third member. 
Petermination of Impasse 
With respect to the question of when an impasse 
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really has occurred, the states have devised the 
following methods for submitting the issue to arbitra¬ 
tion. 
The states of Michigan, Vermont, and Hawaii have 
decided an impasse occurs with the passage of a speci¬ 
fied time period (usually thirty days) after a dispute 
has been submitted to mediation and fact-finding. At 
the end of this time period, if the dispute has not 
been resolved, the issue will be resolved by an 
arbitration board. The states of Rhode Island and 
Wyoming define impasse as the party's inability to 
negotiate a settlement within thirty days of the first 
meeting. After the thirty day time period has passed, 
the issue automatica11y goes to arbitration. The 
Pennsylvania statute specifies’that the failure of a 
legislative body to approve a negotiated agreement is 
considered to be an impasse and must be submitted to 
binding, compulsory arbitration. 
Payment of Arb ? t ration Costs 
The statutes in Michigan, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
and Hawaii provide that the parties involved must bear 
the costs of arbitration equally. In the state of 
Pennsylvania the public employer pays all costs except 
those for the arbitrator representing the employees. 
62 
The statute in the state of Wyoming provides the 
arbitration board with the responsibility and authority 
of determining the cost allocation in all disputes. 
Appea1 of Awa rds 
Provisions for the appeals of awards are made in 
Rhode Island, Vermont, Wyoming, and Michigan. The 
grounds for such appeals are limited to an arbitration 
board exceeding its jurisdiction or participating in 
fraud or misrepresentation to affect the award. 
Michigan also permits appeals if the order is unsup¬ 
ported by competent, material, and substantial evidence 
on the whole record. The Pennsylvania statutes deny 
any right of appeal, while the subject is not discussed 
in the Hawaiian statute. 
Rhode I s1 and. Policemen1s 
Arbitration Statute 
Since 1963 policemen in the State of Rhode Island 
have had the expressed legal right to organize and join 
unions for the purpose of bargaining collectively over 
wages, rates of pay, and other terms and conditions of 
employment. The Policemen's Arbitration Act of 1963 
states, 
. . . the protection of the public health, 
safety, and welfare demands that the full-time 
policemen of any paid police department in any 
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city or town not be accorded the right to strike 
or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown. It 
is hereby declared to be public policy of this 
state to accord to the full-time policemen of 
any paid police department in any city or town 
all of the rights of labor other than the right 
to strike, or engage in any work stoppages or 
slowdown. To provide for the exercise of these 
rights, a method of arbitrat ion of disputes is 
hereby established.^1 
Under this act the policemen have the right to 
join unions. The statute made it the obligation of the 
city or town, acting through its corporate authorities, 
to meet and confer iri good faith with the representative 
of the bargaining agent. Within ten days after receipt 
of a written request from this agent, the parties 'must 
meet for the purpose of collective bargaining. Should 
any impasse be reached within thirty days from the 
start of these negotiations, the unresolved issues must 
be submitted to arbitration. 
Within five days from the expiration of the 
thirty-day period, each of the two parties have to 
select their arbitrator. Within ten days after the 
thirty-day period, the impartial arbitrator must be 
selected. This tripartite arbitration board then must 
start the hearings within ten days after the impartial 
3 ' Gene ra 1 Laws of Rhode Island 1_956, Reenactment 
of 19o9, Vol . 5 (New" York: Bobbs-Mer r fTT Co., irTc. ), 
PP."37b-377. 
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arbitrator has been named and must be concluded within 
twenty days from commencement. An additional ten days 
is granted after the conclusion of the hearings for the 
arbitrators to make a written report of their findings 
and a written award which is not to exceed one year in 
du ration. 
The arbitrators, in conducting the hearings and 
rendering their decision, must partially base the award 
on the facts presented. Other factors must be given 
weight in arriving at a final decision. These factors 
as outlined in the statute include:^ 
(1) Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions 
of employment of the police department in 
question with prevailing wage rates or hourly 
conditions of employment of skilled employees 
of the bui1ding ,trades and industry in the 
local operating area .involved. 
(2) Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions 
of employment of the police department in 
question with wage rates or hourly conditions 
of employment of police departments in cities 
or towns of comparable size. 
(3) Interest and welfare of the public. 
In 1968 an amendment to the Policemen's Arbitration 
Act was enacted. The only difference between the two 
laws was that tne new law made the arbitration board's 
award binding on any and ail parties, and on any and 
32 Ibid., p. 330. 
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all matters. The 1963 law considered the arbitrators' 
award to be advisory. 
In a discussion with several senators involved 
with both laws it was determined that the purpose of 
the first law.was to give the policemen rights which 
were similar to those of employees in the private 
sector. The purpose of the 1968 statute was to give 
the policemen not only rights similar to those of 
industry, but to have a law that would have some means 
of enforcement. 
It was further explained that under advisory 
arbitration, members of the corporate authority would 
not acknowledge the awards. The reason given for this 
was as follows: if the award suggested an increase in 
monetary expenditures, this would automatically mean an 
increase in taxation to the.general public. This 
reasoning is substantiated by the fact that when the 
state legislature was discussing the possibility of 
making the 1963 law binding, thirty-eight of the thirty- 
nine municipal chiefs^ opposed the proposal. The 
reasoning given was that the arbitration board could be 
made up of all out-of-staters and these would be the 
^Municipal chiefs are the highest elected 
officials in the cities and towns. in the cities, 
the chief's title is Mayor, and in the towns, the 
chief's title is Town Council President. 
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persons responsible for the setting of tax rates in the 
communities. 
In order to alleviate this problem, the municipal 
chiefs offered as a compromise, a labor court. This 
court would consist of a specified number of members 
and all would be residents of Rhode Island. The 
legislators decided that this proposal was not accept¬ 
able because of the lack of competent arbitrators in 
the state. In September, 1968, the legislature passed 
the binding, compulsory arbitration law. 
Ana lysis of Law 
The 1968 law has been in effect for three years 
and in this time period, two problems have re-occur red. 
The first problem has been the comparisons that must be 
made between policemen's rates and the rates of journey¬ 
men in the building trades. Most of the arbitrators in 
Rhode Island cases maintain that conclusions drawn by 
the comparison of unlike occupations in different 
sectors of the economy are lacking in substance and are 
unpersuas i ve. If comparisons have to be made other 
than between police departments, it might be more 
feasible to compare occupations within the public 
34Th ere is a possibility that a comparison between 
the policeman in the public sector and the security 
guard in the private sector may prove to be valuable. 
) 
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sector. In so doing, those persons in the two sectors 
of our economy (public and private) could be compared 
separately and perhaps more equitably. 
The second problem has been concerned with the 
number of unresolved issues. What happens is that the 
two sides bargain collectively over a number of issues 
and at some point reach an impasse. Instead of sending 
just those unresolved issues to the arbitration board, 
each side reverts to the original position on a 11 issues 
and aj_l_ issues go to the tripartite panel. This has 
posed a monumental problem in terms of time and money 
spent. Possible solutions for this problem will be 
offered later in this study. 
Summary 
Unionization of federal employees existed as 
early as l800 In naval yards. The first legislation 
with reference to federal policy toward employee 
organizations was the Pendleton Act (commonly known as 
the Civil Service Act) which was passed in 1833. Under 
this act, only Congress had tfie authority to regulate 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
emp 1 oymerit. 
In 1912 Congress passed the Lloyd~La Follette Act, 
which became the basis for the principle that federal 
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employees had the right to join any organization that 
did not assert the right to strike against the govern¬ 
ment. 
President Kennedy furthered the rights of federal 
employees when he signed Executive Order 10938 in 
January, 1962. This made it possible for federal 
employees to have the protected right to join unions 
and engage in collective bargaining with the federal 
agencies for whom they worked. 
Police unionization began in the early 1900's. 
The Fraternal Order of Police was founded in 1915, and 
began to grow in the 1930's. The FOP today is the 
largest national police employee organization and 
claims 90,000 members in forty-two states. 
Only six states have statutes that provide for 
binding arbitration. A comparison of each is made in 
this chapter. The Rhode Island Policemen's Arbitration 




PROCEDURES AND METHOD OF INVESTIGATION 
This chapter is concerned primarily with the 
methodology used in this study. The topics covered are 
(1) definitions of the words or phrases used in 
the study; 
(2) hypotheses tested and their relationship to 
the study; 
(3) methodology used in the study; and 
(4) general information on the sample used. 
Definitions 
Each of the key words and/or phrases used in this 
study shall have the definitions as explained in this 
section. The purpose of these definitions is to enable 
readers to understand the hypotheses and methodology 
utilized throughout the study. To assist in a common 
understanding of this report, a uniform definition of 
the terms used in the study is critical. 
Po 1 i cernen 
"The term 'policemen' shall mean the full-time 
police from the rank of patrolman up to arid including 
the rank of chief, including policewomen of any 
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particular police department in any city or town within 
the state.1 11 ^ 
Emp1oyee Organizat ? on 
Employee organization is defined as any organiza¬ 
tion of any kind in which policemen participate and 
which exists for the primary purpose of dealing with 
the corporate authority concerning grievances, labor 
disputes, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
of employment of policemen.^ 
Exc1 usive Representation 
Exclusive representation means that the employee 
organization has the right to be the collective bar¬ 
gaining agent of all policemen in an appropriate 
bargaining unit without discrimination and without 
regard to employee organization membership.^ 
Representative 
Representative means any individual or individuals 
1 Genera1 Laws of Rhode Island 1956, Reenactment 
of 1969. ("Pocket Supplement Vol . 5 New York: Bobbs- 
Merrill Co., Inc.), p. 4816. 
2Genera1 Laws of Hawai? 1970. Washington, D.C.: 
The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1970, p. 13. 
3 | b i d. 
71 
acting for the corporate authority or the policemen and 
snail’ include employee organizations. 
Corporate Author ? ty 
"The term 'corporate authority' shall mean the 
proper officials within any city or town whose duty or 
duties it is to establish the wages, salaries, rates of 
pay, hours, working conditions of employment of police¬ 
men, whether they be the mayor, city manager, town 
manager, town administrator, city council, town council, 
director of personnel, personnel board or commission or 
by whatever other name the same may be designated, or 
any combination thereof."** 
Superv ? sory Emp1oyee 
Supervisory employee means any individual having 
authority in the interest of the corporate authority 
to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, 
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other police¬ 
men, or the responsibility to assign work to and direct 
them, or to adjust their grievances, or recommend such 
actions, if the exercise of such authority is not 
4Genera1 Laws of Rhode Is1 and 1956, Reenactment 
of 1969~ (Pocket Supplement Vol. 5 New York: Bobbs- 
"Rerrill Co., Inc.), p. 4816. 
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merely routine or clerical, but requires independent 
j udgment.5 
Co 11ective Ba rqaininq 
"Collective bargaining means the performance of 
the mutual obligation of the corporate authority and 
the exclusive representative to'meet at reasonable 
times, to confer and negotiate in good faith, and to 
execute a written agreement with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
except that by any such obligation neither party shall 
be compelled to agree to a proposal, or be required to 
make a concession."0 
Labor Dispute 
The term labor dispute includes any controversy 
between the corporate authority and the policemen or 
their representatives concerning terms, tenure or 
conditions of employment or concerning the association 
or represent ation of persons in negotiating, fixing, 
5Genera1 Laws of Hawaii 1970, p. 13. 
6 Ib ? d. For add itional information on definitions 
of collective bargaining, see Section 8 (d), Labor- 
Management Relations Act, 19^7 or C. V/11 son Randle and 
Max S. Wortman, Jr., Collective Bargaining (2nd ed.; 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company^ 1 9o6), pp. 5-8. 
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maintaining, changing, or seeking to negotiate, fix, 
maintain or change terms or conditions of employment.'7 
Impasse 
Impasse means the failure of a corporate authority 
and an exclusive representative to achieve agreement in 
the course of collective bargaining. 
S t r i ke 
Strike is described as a policeman's refusal, in 
concerted action with others, to report for duty, or 
his wilful absence from this position, or his stoppage 
of work, or his abstinence in whole or in part from the 
full, faithful, and proper performance of the duties of 
employment, for the purpose of inducing, influencing, 
or coercing a change in the conditions, compensation, 




Fact-finding is defined as the identification of 
the major issues in a particular impasse, review of the 
positions of the parties and resolutions of factual 
7Rhode I s1 and State Labor Re 1 at 1 ons Act, (Rhode 
Island: Rhode Island State Labor Re 1 at ions Board), p. 3. 
^Genera 1 Laws of Hawai? 19/0, p. 13. 
differences by one or more impartial fact-finders, and 
the making of recommendations for settlement of the 
impasse. 
Med i ation 
Mediation is the assistance by an impartial third 
party to reconcile an impasse between the corporate 
authority and the exclusive representative regarding 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment through interpretation, suggestion, and 
advice to resolve the impasse.9. 
Arbit ration 
Arbitration is the procedure whereby parties 
involved in an impasse mutually agree to submit their 
differences to a third party for a final and binding 
decision. 
Cornpu 1 sory A rb i t rat i on 
Compulsory arbitration is the procedure whereby 
public law requires the corporate authority and the 
policemen to submit their differences to a third party 
for a final and binding decision, and to prohibit work 
stoppages. 
^Genera1 Laws of Hawaii 1970> p. 13. 
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Compu1sory Arbitration Board 
Compulsory arbitration board means the panel of 
three persons who will meet and decide on any impasse 
between the corporate authority and the exclusive 
representative. 
Ope rationa1 Procedu res 
Operational procedures mean the precise method of 
handling arbitration cases and the mode of internal 
workings of the board. The internal workings of the 
board shall be considered to be formal if the proceed¬ 
ings of the board's decision-making process are similar 
to those used in a court of law. Otherwise the internal 
workings shall be classified as informal. 
Type of Issue 
Type of issue means the distinction between wage 
issues and non-wage issues. V/age issues shall include 
anything dealing with monetary values such as the 
determination of wages, hours and work scheduling, 
pension plans and health and welfare plans. Non-wage 
issues shall include anything dealing with non-monetary 
values such as seniority, discipline, and job security. 
Form of Government 
Form of government means the distinction made by 
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the State of Rhode Island as to the municipalities 
classified as cities and those classified as towns. 
Those municipalities which have been designated as 
cities are classified as such upon the request of the 
people residing within certain geographical boundaries, 
contingent upon approval by the state legislature. 
General Hypotheses 
This section includes the general hypotheses and 
the operational hypotheses which will be used to con¬ 
sider some of the effects of compulsory arbitration 
boards upon police labor-management relations in the 
State of Rhode Island. 
Hypot hes ? s J_: The more urban the geographic location, 
the more likely’a compulsory arbitration 
board will be used in settling disputes 
between the union and the corporate 
authority. 
According to Loewenberg, the resolution of im¬ 
passes in negotiations by compulsory arbitration in the 
state of Pennsylvania did not seem to be related to the 
size of the locality. There is some evidence that the 
resolution of impasses in some localities were obtained 
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through compulsory arbitration.^ In order to determine 
whether or not impasses have been resolved by compulsory 
arbitration in the State of Rhode Island, the following 
operational ‘hypotheses were established: 
Ope rationa1 Hypothesis _h There is no 
statistically significant relationship between 
the population in a geographic location and the 
utilization of a compulsory arbitration board. 
Ope rationa1 Hypothesis I I: There is no 
statistically significant relationship between 
the form of government in a geographic location 
and the utilization of a compulsory arbitration 
boa rd. 
Hypothesis I I: The greater the proportion of union 
•_ members in the bargaining unit, the 
greater the chances of using the 
compulsory arbitration board. 
Professor Loewenberg also indicated that not only 
is there an absence of a relationship between the size 
of the city (and/or town), and an impasse being resolved 
^Oj. Joseph Loewenberg, "Compulsory Arbitration 
for Police and Fire Fighters in Pennsylvania in 1968," 
I ndustrial and Labor Re 1 at ions Rev 1ew, Volume 23, 
Number~3 [April, \310Y. P~- 3o9. 
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by compulsory arbitration', but there was no indication 
of any relationship between the size of the local police 
force and the use of a compulsory arbitration board. 
In addition to this relationship brought forth by 
Professor Loewenberg, a condition which also should be 
examined would be the type of union security that exists 
within a particular police department. If there were 
very few union members in the bargaining unit, the 
union may not be powerful enough to force an issue to 
compulsory arbitration. This kind of relationship will 
be examined by means of operational hypothesis IV. 
When compulsory arbitration has to be used, 
information regarding the types of proceedings must be 
known for the purpose of preparing for the arbitration 
hearing--the event where cases are won or lost. Types 
of proceedings would be defined as the formal proceed¬ 
ings and the informal proceedings. 
The operational hypotheses which v/i 11 be used to 
test this general hypothesis are as follows: 
Operational Hypothesis III: There is no 
statistically significant relationship between 
the number of full-time policemen in a geographic 
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location and the utilization of a compulsory 
a rbit ration boa rd. 
# 
Ope rationa1 Hypothes1s I V: There is no 
statistically sign.ificant relationship between 
the number of members in a bargaining unit and 
the utilization of a compulsory arbitration 
boa rd. 
Ope rat i ona 1 Hypot hes i s _V: There is no 
significant relationship between the number of 
members in the bargaining unit and the formal 
operational procedures the compulsory arbitration 
boa rd wi11 use. 
Ope rationa1 Hypothesis V1: There is no 
significant relationship between the type of 
issue to be decided and the formal operational 
procedures the compulsory arbitration board 
will use. 
Hypothesis Ml: The presence of a compulsory arbitra¬ 
tion board has had an effect on the 
labor-management relations in those 
communities that have had an experience 
with a compulsory arbitration board. 
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According to Northrup, no institution or method 
of determining conditions of work is, or can be, 
perfectly satisfactory to everyone. But few things are 
more important to both the individual and society than 
the methods of determining the conditions under which 
individuals buy and sell each other's and their own 
labor. The successful determination of the conditions 
under which these individuals must operate lies in 
whether or not a form of emergency strike legislation 
could be devised which does not inhibit collective 
bargaining. Professor Northrup's evidence indicates 
that compulsory arbitration: (1) does not insure peace 
in a working environment, but can breed strikes; 
(2) enhances union power and growth, especially through 
political action; and (3) discourages collective 
ba rgaining.^ 
To attempt to determine if these conditions exist 
in police departments in the State of-Rhode Island the 
following operational hypotheses will be used in 
conjunction with later ones to test the general 
^Herbert R. Northrup, Compu1 sory Arbitration 
and Government Intervention in Labor Disputes 
(Washington, D.C.: Labor Policy Association, Inc., 
1966), pp. 179-180. 
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hypothesis: 
Ope rationa1 Hypothesis VII: Pol icemen feel that 
the compulsory arbitration board has affected the 
collective bargaining process. 
i 
Ope rationa1 Hypothesis VIII: Members of the 
corporate authority feel that the compulsory 
arbitration board has affected the collective 
bargaining process. 
Price has indicated that a board's impact on 
morale could be determined to the extent to which 
individual motives are satisfied by the organization. 
Some customary measures of morale are turnover, 
absenteeism, accidents, tardiness, and verbal state¬ 
ments of satisfaction.^ 
The following operational hypotheses will be used 
to examine this aspect of the labor-management relations 
noted in the general hypothesis: 
Ope rationa1 Hypothesis 1X: The percentage 
increase in wages has been greater subsequent to 
to the enactment of the compulsory arbitration 
1 3 
^James L. Price, "The Impact of Governing Boards 
on Organizationa1 Effectiveness and Morale," 
Administ rative Science Qua rte r1y, Volume 8, Number 3 
(December, 19o3), pp. 3o2-3b3. 
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law than prior to the law. 
Ope rat i ona 1 Hypothes i s X_: The grievance rate 
(in per cent) has been greater subsequent to the 
enactment of the compulsory arbitration law than 
prior to the law. 
Methodo1ogy 
This section describes the sources of data and the 
methods used in this study. In addition, the procedures 
for analyzing the data will be presented. The section 
will be divided into the following categories: 
(1) Sources of data; (2) Methods for obtaining data; 
and (3) Analysis of data. 
Sources of Data 
* 
There will be two primary sources of data which 
will be used in this survey. The first source will be 
the Statutes in the State of Rhode Island. Section 
Number Seven of the General Laws of the State of Rhode 
Island dealing with Labor and Industrial Relations will 
be used to obtain information concerning compulsory 
arbit rat ion. 
The second primary source of data will be persons 
that have had experience with compulsory arbitration 
boards in their community. The persons to be included 
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are as follows: 
' (1) The top ranking officer of the policeman's 
association in each community in which a 
campulsory arbitration board has functioned; 
(2) The.top ranking official of the corporate 
authority in each community in which a 
compulsory arbitration board has functioned; 
(3) The personnel director in each community in 
which a compulsory arbitration board has 
functioned; and 
(4) Each of the three arbitrators who decided the 
issue or issues in each community.^ 
Methods for Obtaining Data 
The methodological procedure consists of three 
parts. First, there will be a detai1ed ana 1ysis of the 
state law which provides for the implementation of the 
compulsory arbitration board. The coverage of this law 
14According to state law, within twenty-five 
calendar days from the date of the first meeting 
between the bargaining agents and the corporate 
authority, these two parties shall each select and name 
one arbitrator. These two arbitrators so selected and 
named shall agree upon and select and name a third 
arbitrator. Thus the compulsory arbitration board 
consists of three persons: one considered to be the 
union arbitrator, one considered to be the corporate 
authority arbitrator, and one considered to be the 
neutral arbitrator. 
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regarding compulsory arbitration is included in the 
General Laws of the State of Rhode Island. 
Second, using structured questionnaires (see 
Appendix B), each of the selected persons will be 
interviewed. It should be noted that each person will 
be interviewed with a questionnaire devised especially 
for persons in that category. The questions for each 
category are worded so as to facilitate analysis of the 
hypotheses. 
Ana lysis of Data 
The data which are obtained from the questionnaire 
will be used to test each of the operational hypo¬ 
theses . 1 5 
Twelve communities in the State of Rhode Island 
have used compulsory arbitration boards. A general 
analysis will be based on specific answers received to 
the questionnaires. Since the same questions10 are 
asked of the different types of interviewee the various 
responses may be compared which may enable generaliza¬ 
tions to be made. 
^For an analysis of the questions that apply to 
each hypothesis, see Appendix C. 
16 See Appendix C. 
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General Information 
The compulsory binding arbitration law concerning 
i 
police departments in the State of Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations was enacted in September, 1968. 
From this date to March 31, 1971, compulsory binding 
arbitration has been implemented fourteen times in 
twelve communities. Of these twelve locations, seven 
were classified as cities with a population ranging 
from 18,716 to 179,213 and a police force consisting of 
36 to 414 total law enforcement officers respectively. 
In addition, two of these cities have used binding 
arbitration more than once. Five of the locations were 
classified as towns with a population ranging from 
2,911 to 26,605 and a police force ranging from seven 
to thirty respectively. 
In the State of Rhode Island there are two organ¬ 
izations to which policemen may belong--one organization 
is the Fraternal Order of Police, commonly known as the 
FOP. The other is the International Brotherhood of 
Police Officers, often known as the IBPO. In eight of 
the twelve communities studied, the FOP was the recog¬ 
nized bargaining agent for the policemen, while the IBPO 
represented the policemen i ri the other four. 
In five of the twelve communities, all of the law 
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enforcement officers were members of either the FOP or 
the IBPO. The remaining seven communities had at least 
one non-member of the union in the police department. 
In six of these seven cases the chief was considered to 
be the non-member and was excluded from membership by 
agreement between labor and the corporate authority. 
In addition to the chief's exclusion, two communities 
had other high ranking members of the police force also 
excluded by agreement. 
Finally, in four communities of the twelve, at 
least one member of the rank and file did not wish to 
be a member of any bargaining unit and was excluded. 
Summa ry 
Included in this chapter is a presentation of the 
definition of terms used throughout the study, the 
general hypotheses, the operational hypotheses, and the 
procedures and method of data collection. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the 
results of the study. The three sections in this 
chapter include: (1) response to survey; (2) results 
related to the hypotheses; and (3) results related to 
the opinion questions regarding binding, compulsory 
a rbit ration. 
Response to Survey 
The twelve communities which have been involved 
with binding, compulsory arbitration are: Bristol, 
Central Falls, Cranston, Cumberland, Jamestown, North 
Providence, Pawtucket, Providence, Tiverton, Warwick, 
V/est Warwick, and Woonsocket. Table 5.1 indicates the 
form of government, population statistics, and number 
of police officers for each locality. 
The small size of Rhode Island made it possible 
to interview all the parties that had been involved in 
binding, compulsory arbitration in each community. Of 
the total of sixty-five persons, sixty-four agreed to 
be interviewed for a 93.4 per cent response (see 
Table 5.2). The only person that did not provide time 
for an interview was a police chief (see Table 5.3). 
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TABLE 5.1 
COMMUNITIES SURVEYED IN THE STUDY OF THE OPERATIONS 
OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS 








Bristol Town 17,860 24 
Cent ra1 Falls City 18,716 36 
Cranston City 73,037 105 
Cumbe r1 and Town 26,605 30 
Jamestown Town 2,91 1 7 
North Providence Town 24,337 
• 
31 
Pawtucket City 76,984 153 
P rovidence City 179, 213 414 
Tive rton Town 12,559 15 
Wa rwick City 83,694 150 
West Warwick Town 24,323 38 
Woonsocket City 46,820 101 
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TABLE 5.2 
RESPONSE OF PERSONS TO SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE STUDY 
OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 
BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1971 
Person Number Percent 
Respondent 64 98.4 
Non-respondent 1 1.6 
Total 65 100.0 
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TABLE 5.3 
RESPONSE OF COMMUNITIES TO STATISTICAL DATA IN THE STUDY 
OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 
BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1971 
Community Number Percent 
Respondent 1 1 91.5 
Non-respondent 1 8.5 
Total 1 2 100.0 
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In one other community some difficulty was encountered 
in gathering statistical data. Turnover rates and 
absentee rates could not be obtained because the 
information would have to have been abstracted from 
each policeman's confidential personal file. Since the 
grievance rates and the salary rates in this community 
were not classified, they were provided for the study. 
In this study the following persons were to be 
inte rviewed: 
(1) The top ranking officer of the policemen's 
assoc i at i on.; 
(2) The top ranking official of the corporate 
authority; 
(3) The personnel director; 
(4) Each of the three arbitrators involved with 
the decisions. 
No difficulties were encountered in interviewing the 
twelve officers of the policemen's association or the 
twelve officials of the corporate authority. Only five 
of the twelve communities had personnel directors--a 11 
of whom were interviewed. In six communities that did 
not have a personnel director, the chief of police was 
interviewed using the personnel directors' questionnaire. 
In the seventh community, the police chief did not 
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coope rate. 
Of the fourteen binding arbitration cases heard 
in the twelve communities, nine persons were employed 
as corporate authority arbitrators. One of the nine 
heard five cases, another heard two, and the remaining 
seven heard one each. There were seven union arbitrators, 
one person having served on five cases, another person 
having served on four, and the remainder on one each. 
Eight neutral arbitrators were employed, two of whom 
were appointed three times, two others were appointed 
twice, and the four remaining once each (see Table 5.4). 
On 1y one arbitrator was named in two capacities. 
In one case he was appointed by the union while in 
another he was a neutral. This practice is not encour¬ 
aged by any parties since labels are not easily attached 
to such individuals. Unions, as well as corporate 
authorities, prefer to choose someone they are able to 
trust and who will work diligently for their interests. 
From observations in this study, it may well be very 
difficult for this person to be selected as an arbiter 
again as several interviewees felt that he could not be 
trusted by the parties. 
The occupations of the arbiters differ widely. 
Ten (42 per cent) of the twenty-four total arbitrators 
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TABLE 5.4 
NUMBER OF CASES HEARD BY ARBITRATORS 
IN RHODE ISLAND, 1971 
Number of Cases Heard 
A rbit rator* 1 2 3 4 5 
Corporate Authority 7 1 0 0 1 
Un i on 5 0 0 1 1 
Neut ra1 4 2 2 • O' 0 
L 
*0ne arbitrator was named in two capacities. 
3h 
interviewed were attorney-s, seven (29 per cent) were 
associated with the teaching profession, three (13 per 
cent) were businessmen, two (8 per cent) were members 
of the clergy, and two (8 per cent) were full-time 
arbiters. 
Results Related to the Hypotheses 
The results of the survey as related to the 
hypotheses set forth in Chapter IV will be discussed in 
this section. In each case, the original working 
hypothesis will be stated followed by an analysis of 
the data used to test the hypothesis. On completion of 
the analysis of the working hypotheses, conclusions 
will be drawn on the general hypotheses. 
Popu1 at 1 on in a Geoqraph ? c Location 
Ope rat ? ona 1 Hypothes ? s J_: There is no 
-statistically significant relationship between 
the population in a geographic location and the 
utilization of a compulsory arbitration board. 
Using the Chi-square test of independence, there 
is a statistically significant relationship between 
geographic location and the utilization of a compulsory 
arbitration board.^ Operational hypothesis one is 
^ A11 Chi-square tests of independence were run at 
the .95 level of significance. 
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therefore rejected. 
The contingency coefficient used to determine the 
degree of association between two variables indicates 
that these two are closely related^ (see Table 5.5). 
Form of Government 
Ope rationa1 Hypothesis 1 I: There is no 
statistically significant relationship between 
the form of government in a geographic location 
and the utilization of a compulsory arbitration 
board. 
There is a statistically significant relationship 
betv/een the form of government and the utilization of 
a compulsory arbitration board. Operational hypothesis 
tv/o is rejected. 
The contingency coefficient of .433 indicates that 
the degree of association betv/een these tv/o variables 
is strong (see Table 5.6). 
Locat i on of Cor.pu 1 sory Arb ? t rat ion Usage 
There are tv/o of a possible nineteen localities 
= .546. In a two-by-tv/o contingency table, 
the maximum value of C is .707. For information on the 
maximum value of C, see: Sidney Siegal, Nonpa ramet ric 
Statistics for the Behaviora1 Sciences (New York: 
McGraw-Hi11 Book Company, Inc.^ i956), p. 195-202. 
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TABLE 5.5 
ANALYSIS OF THE POPULATION SIZE AND THE UTILIZATION OF 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1971 
N=39 







& Ove r Tota 1 
Yes 4 8 1 2 
No 22 5 2.7 
Total 26 13 39 
2=16.6 d/f=1 
y2.95=3.84 C= .-546; Cmax=.707 
Si.nce the derived value of 
the Chi-square is less than the 
value of Chi-square at the .95 
level of significance, the hypo¬ 
thesis of the independence between 
the population in a community and 
the utilization of a compulsory 





ANALYSIS OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND THE UTILIZATION 
OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1971 
N=39 
Utilization 
of Boa rd 
Form of Government 
Tota 1 
City Town 
Yes 6 6 1 2 
No 2 25 27 
Tota 1 8 31 39 
y 2=8.96 d/f=1 
i'1.95=3.84 C=.433; Cmax=. 707 
Since the derived value of the 
Chi-square is less than the value of 
Chi-square at the .95 level of sig¬ 
nificance, the hypothesis of the 
independence between the form of 
government in a community and the 
utilization of a compulsory arbitra¬ 
tion board is rejected. 
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with a population figure of under 15,000 that have gone 
to binding arbitration (see Appendix D, Table 1). 
Binding arbitration has been used in 10 per cent of the 
communities in this population class to settle contract 
disputes with the police departments. In communities 
that list the population size as 15,000 and over, 50 
per cent have used binding arbitration. In communities 
with a population of over 50,000, 33 per cent have used 
binding, compulsory arbitration. 
Moreover, six of the eight city police departments 
in Rhode Island have resorted to binding, compulsory 
arbitration (75 per cent), whereas only six towns of a 
possible thirty-one (19 per cent), have utilized binding 
arbit rat ion. 
These data and the statistical data previously 
reported lead to the rejection of operational hypotheses 
numbers one and two, and would tend to support general 
hypothesis number one, which stated: The more urban 
the geocraph1c 1ocation, the more 1 ? ke1y a compu1 sory 
a rbit ration boa rd will be used in sett 11nq d ? sputes 
between t he union and the corporate author ? ty. 
What these data mean to Rhode Island in terms of 
practical significance is that the cities may well be 
used as the pattern setters for the towns. If the union 
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is able to concentrate its pressure against the major 
cities, which seem to be most susceptible to agreement 
on favorable terms, it may be able to use those terms 
as the pattern for the smaller localities. With the 
pattern set by. the cities, the burden may be placed on 
other communities to show-why they cannot grant terms 
at least as favorable. If some less prosperous communi¬ 
ties can indeed make such a showing, the terms may be 
lessened to a degree, but only after rigorous bargaining. 
Full -T ime Po1icemen 
Ope rat ? ona1 Hypothesis 111: There is no 
statistically significant relationship between 
the number of full-time policemen in a geographic 
location and the utilization of a compulsory 
arbitration board. 
An analysis of the data indicates that there is a 
significant relationship between the number of full-time 
policemen in a geographic location and the utilization 
of a compulsory arbitration board. Operational hypo¬ 
thesis number three is rejected. 
In addition, some relationship is indicated 
between these two variables as the contingency 
coefficient equals .370 (see Table 5.7). 
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TABLE 5.7 
ANALYSIS OF THE NUMBER OF POLICEMEN IN A COMMUNITY AND 
THE UTILIZATION OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN 
RHODE ISLAND, 1971 
N=39 
Ut i 1ization 
of Board 
dumber of Policemen 




& Ove r 
Yes 5 7 12 
No 22 5 27 
Total 27 1 2 39 
^'.2=6.14 d/f = 1 
-^l2.95=3.84 C=. 370; Cmax=.707 
Since the derived value of Chi- 
square is less than the value of Ch i - 
square at the .95 level of significance, 
the hypothesis of the independence be¬ 
tween the number of policemen in a 
community and the utilization of a 




Ope rationa1 Hypothesis I V: There is no 
statistically significant relationship between 
the number of members in a bargaining unit and 
the utilization of a compulsory arbitration board. 
There is a statistically significant relationship 
between the number of members in a bargaining unit and 
the utilization of a compulsory arbitration board, thus 
leading to the rejection of operational hypothesis 
number four. 
The contingency coefficient of .410 indicates 
that there is some relationship between these two 
variables (see Table 5.8). 
Members Versus Ope rationa1 Procedures^ 
Ope rat ? ona1 Hypothesis V: There is no significant 
relationship between the number of members in the 
bargaining unit and the formal operational 
procedures the compulsory arbitration board will 
use. 
To determine whether or not a relationship existed 
between the number of members in a bargaining unit and 
^See Appendix D, Tables 2 and 3. 
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TABLE 5.8 
ANALYSIS OF THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS IN A COMMUNITY'S POLICE 
LABOR ORGANIZATION AND THE UTILIZATION OF COMPULSORY 









& Ove r 
Yes 5 7 1 2 
No 23 4 27 
Total 28 1 1 39 
^2=7.67 d/ f -1 
^2.95=3.84 ' C =.41 0; Cmax=.707 
Since the derived value of the 
Chi-square is less than the.value of 
Chi-square at the .95 level of sig¬ 
nificance, the hypothesis of the 
independence between the number of 
members in a police labor organiza¬ 
tion and the utilization of a 
compulsory arbitration board is rejected. 
% 
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the formality of operational procedures used by the 
arbitration board, the arbitrators employed in each of 
the communities were questioned as to the degree of 
formality used by each board. The results indicate 
that 91.6 per cent of the arbitrators selected by the 
union perceived the operational procedures followed by 
the board (that is, the swearing in of witnesses, 
presentation of facts, evidence that would be accepted, 
and the procedures of the hearings) as formal, 71.^+ per 
cent of the neutral arbitrators perceived the procedures 
as formal, and only 33.3 per cent of the corporate 
authority arbitrators felt this way. In two of the 
twelve communities all three arbitrators indicated the 
procedures were formal. Two out of three arbitrators in 
four communities indicated that their procedures 
followed a formal pattern, while two out of three 
arbitrators stated informal operations existed in five 
communities. In one community all arbitrators stated 
that the operational procedures were of an informal 
natu re. 
It appears from these data that the degree of 
formality or informality as indicated by each of the 
arbitrators is definitely a matter of perception. It 
is possible that the union arbitrators, after witnessing 
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loosely run union meetings, perceive the arbitration 
proceedings to be formal in contrast to such meetings. 
The corporate authority arbitrator may be used to 
operating very formally and his perception of the 
proceedings may be one of informality. 
I ssues Versus Ope rationa1 Procedure 
Ope rationa1 Hypothes ? s V I: There is no significant 
relationship between the type of issue to be 
decided and the formal operational procedures the 
compulsory arbitration board will use. 
Identical results are obtained with respect to 
operational hypothesis number six. In every instance 
where binding, compu1sory arbitration was implemented, 
a wage issue was decided. In addition to the wage 
issue, non-v/age issues also were decided in each 
community.^ In every case, regardless of the type of 
issue the arbitrators' perception of the operational 
procedures was identical to the views portrayed for 
operational hypothesis number five.^ The data tend to 
indicate that there is no significant relationship 
^Neither wage nor non-v/age issues v/ere investigated 
in depth. 
^See Appendix D, Table 3. 
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between the type of issue to be decided and the 
operational procedures the compulsory arbitration 
board wi11 use. 
Membe rship and Uti1j zat ? on of Arbitration 
As noted, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the number of full-time policemen 
in a geographic location and the utilization of a 
compulsory arbitration board and the number of members 
in a bargaining unit and the utilization of a compulsory 
arbitration board. In addition .there is evidence to 
indicate that general hypothesis number two should be 
accepted. It stated: The greater the proportion of 
union members in the bargaininq unit the qreater the 
•chances of using the compu1sory a rbit ration boa rd. 
The practical significance of these fundings for 
Rhode- Island is that power relations do exist in the 
collective bargaining process. According to Selekman, 
et. a 1., 
It i s by mobilizing their power, economic, 
political, and moral--that workers and their 
leaders compel management.in the first instance 
to deal with them and then to grant, in whole 
or in part, the demands which they make upon the 
corporation. It is by countering with power-- 
economic, political, and moral--that corporate 
management determines how much and to what extent 




This is exactly what has been happening in Rhode 
Island since the enactment of the compulsory arbitration 
statu.te. The police organizations know that they now 
have a powerful tool and the corporate authority seems 
less able to use it as efficiently. 
If the corporate authority and the union do not 
recognize these power components as the critical ele¬ 
ments in determining their relationships with each 
other, they are being naive and run the risk of jeopard¬ 
izing effective positive relations. This is not to say 
that other values do not have an effect on these 
relationships. Factors such as the nature and history 
of the relationship, types of personalities that occupy 
the positions of leadership, and prevailing economic 
conditions all have an effect of this relationship. 
Po1icemen 
Ope rationa1 Hypothesis VII: Pol icemen feel that 
the compulsory arbitration board has affected the 
collective bargaining process. 
Policemen interviewed expressed little doubt that 
^Benjamin H. Selekman, e_t. aj_. , Probl ems i n Labor 
Re 1 ations (3rd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc., 1964). pp. 4-9. 
107 
compulsory arbitration has affected the collective 
bargaining process. In eleven of the twelve communities 
it was reported that prior to binding arbitration there 
was a "take it or leave it" attitude on the part of the 
administration. According to union officials inter¬ 
viewed, this same attitude prevailed even under advisory 
arbitration. Apparently the city administrators believed 
that they did not have to comply with the arbitrator's 
decision. 
Since the advent of binding, compulsory arbitration, 
collective bargaining has become more realistic according 
to interviewees. One officer felt that it forces 
administration officials to listen and to be more 
agreeable to the organization. In addition to this 
obvious kind of response, compulsory arbitration forces 
the corporate authority to offer proposals and counter¬ 
proposals more rapidly. A time-table has been 
established in the law and if a decision is not reached 
within a stated period, the unresolved issues auto¬ 
matically go to arbitration. 
The collective bargaining process has also been 
affected because the policemen say they now have a 
procedure to follow if they do not approve the package 
offered by the administration and this procedure does 
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not denigrate their public image. 
The one union official who reported that binding, 
compulsory arbitration did not have any effect on 
collective bargaining would make no further comment as 
to why he felt this way. 
Ten of the eleven persons who noted the positive 
effect on collective bargaining stated that in no 
instance did binding, compulsory arbitration discourage 
collective bargaining. Binding arbitration enhances 
collective bargaining they said because there is an 
equalization of power. Each side knows the other has a 
weapon and therefore each is more realistic at the 
negotiating table. 
The two persons who stated that compulsory 
arbitration discouraged collective bargaining were from 
small towns with small police forces. It was the 
opinion of these two that the administration officials 
knew that there was little money in the union treasury 
and the union could not afford to go to arbitration. 
Since there would be no arbitration hearing there was 
no weapon to bargain in good faith, and collective bar¬ 
gaining was discouraged.^ 
^Contrary to the opinion of these two men, union 
organizations at the next level or at the international 
level would not permit the local union to be dissolved. 
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Union officials interviewed expressed mixed 
opinions on the effect of compulsory arbitration as a 
means of increasing their power and growth, thereby 
equalizing the power of both parties. Seven union 
officials (58 per cent) felt that policemen in Rhode 
Island had discovered how much could be obtained in 
terms of benefits (both wage and non-wage) if they 
banded together to enhance power and growth. The five 
union officials who stated there was no effect between 
compulsory arbitration and a union's power and growth 
also stated that only the strike weapon could affect a 
union's power and growth. 
Regarding whether or not compulsory arbitration 
is a means to municipal peace, four union officials 
(33 per cent) reported it was not. According to the 
four union officials, it is known by both parties that 
each is bound by the decision of the compulsory 
arbitration board and this has been a factor in improved 
morale. The eight union officials stated that the 
arbitration process will never be able to deal with the 
complexities of any one single dispute. Having an 
arbitration board make a decision and leaving the 
implementation of the decision to the parties involved 




Ope rationa1 Hypothesis VIII: Members of the 
corporate authority feel that the compulsory 
arbitration board has affected the collective 
bargaining process. 
Eleven of twelve administrators stated that 
compulsory arbitration had an effect on collective 
bargaining. This effect has been both positive and 
negative. On the positive side, compulsory arbitration 
was said to force both parties to pay more attention to 
collective bargaining. When arbitrators' awards were 
advisory in nature, members of the corporate authority 
admittedly disregarded any decisions of which they did 
not approve. Now that awards are binding, the corporate 
authority is apprehensive about the possibility of an 
unjust award, that is, unjust in the sense of ability 
to pay or to implement an unclear award. Agreements 
reached under collective bargaining are far superior to 
arbitration, according to administrators. 
One negative effect that compulsory arbitration 
has had on collective bargaining is said to be the 
reluctance of the corporate authority to make known its 
final offer in negotiations. The reason given for this' 
is that administrators are apprehensive of the results 
should the case go to arbitration after the last offer 
is made known. Under these conditions the starting 
point for arbitration would be at the level of the last 
offer and this may prohibit good faith bargaining. 
Although agreeing with the unions by stating that 
compulsory arbitration has had an effect on collective 
bargaining, the members of the corporate authority 
differ in the way they said bargaining has been affected 
While ten union officials (83 per cent) reported that 
compulsory arbitration enhanced collective bargaining, 
eleven corporate authority officials (92 per cent) 
stated that compulsory arbitration discouraged collec¬ 
tive bargaining. It is generally felt that since the 
union now has a weapon, compulsory arbitration, they 
desire to use it. Administrators feel that attitudes 
of "what can we lose?" on the part of a union make 
bargaining difficult if not impossible. 
Eight members of the corporate authority (61 per 
cent) felt that the unions power and growth have been 
enhanced by compulsory arbitration, and four reported 
that there was no effect. Ten of a possible twelve 
stated that compulsory arbitration did not improve the 
likelihood of municipal peace because the policemen 
could see that awards give them more, causing them to 
1 1 2 
want even more. They would be willing to pay the 
expense of arbitration to obtain this they said. 
Salary Rates 
Ope rat ? ona1 Hypothesis IX: The percentage in¬ 
crease in wages has been greater subsequent to 
the enactment of the compulsory arbitration law 
than prior to the law. 
Salary rates have fluctuated from 1965 through 
1970, but each year the average raise for police 
officers was in excess of the rise in the cost of 
living.^ In 1966 the average increase for policemen 
exceeded the cost of living index by 0.1%, in 1967 by 
2.4%, in 1968 by 1.9%, in 1969 by 5.6%, and in 1970 by 
3.2% (see Table 5.9). 
From 1965 to the enactment of the compulsory 
arbitration law in 1968, five communities (41 per cent) 
did not award salary increases to police officers. 
Since the implementation of this arbitration statute, 
all policemen have obtained a monetary increase. 
With the exception of 1970, average wage rates 
have increased (see Table 5.9). The probability exists 
^Handbook of. Labor Statistics 1970, Washington, 
D.C.: (U.S. Department of Labor--Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 1970), p. 167. 
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TABLE 5.9 
PERCENTAGE SALARY INCREASES COMPARED WITH COST OF LIVING 
PERCENTAGES FOR THE COMMUNITIES SURVEYED IN THE STUDY 
OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 






1 96b 3.7 3.6 
1967 6'. 8 4.4 
1968 7.4 5.5 
1969 10.7 5.1 
1970 8.8 5.6 
that the reason for a decline in the average wage 
increase was due to the general economic conditions in 
the country. 
There is no indication that this steady rise in 
real wage rates (disregarding the cost of living index) 
has been affected by the binding, compulsory arbitration 
statute. Other factors such as comparable wage rates, 
the tax structure in each community, the general 
economy as a whole, and public reactions would have to 
be included as additional reasons for this upward trend 
in real wages. 
G rievance Rates^ 
Ope rat i ona 1 Mypothes i s X_: The grievance rate (in 
per cent) has been greater subsequent to the enact¬ 
ment of the compulsory arbitration law than prior 
jto the law. 
From the years 1965 to 1970, five of the twelve 
communities reported that they had no grievances. Of 
these five, three were cities, and their populations 
ranged from the smallest to the largest. The two towns 
that reported not having any grievances were of medium 
size. No community reported having a grievance in the 
^See Table 5.10. 
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TABLE 5.10 
NUMBER OF GR 
STUDY OF THE 
IEVANCES FOR THE COMMUNITIES SURVEYED IN THE 
OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 











• In the years 1966 and 1967 a total of five 
grievances dealing with police contracts were reported 
in the communities studied. Two communities had two 
each, and only one community reported a total of six in 
1968. The same number (six) was reported in 1969, and 
in 1970 sixteen grievances were reported by four 
communities. 
This evidence indicates that grievance rates have 
been increasing, especially since 1968. In is unrea¬ 
sonable to attribute this rise solely to compulsory 
arbitration. In addition to the advent of compulsory 
arbitration, more policemen have been added to each 
department, and it is evident that the labor organiza¬ 
tions are becoming more sophisticated in the overall 
grievance procedure. 
Tu move r Rates ^ ^ 
A trend observed concerning turnover rates is 
that more policemen are being added to the force than 
are being separated. The years 1965 through 1970 show 
the following accession rates: A.6%, 4.1%, 3.5%, 5.6%, 
3.6%, and 4.2%; the separation rates are: 2.6%, 3.3%, 
lOSee Table 5.11. 
TABLE 5J 1 
TURNOVER RATES FOR THE COMMUNITIES SURVEYED IN THE STUDY 
OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 
BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND, 1965-1970 
Turnover Rates 
New Hires Sepa rations 
Yea r Actua1 Pe rcentage Act ua1 Pe rcentage 
1965 46 4.6 26 2.6 
1966 41 4. 1 33 3.3 
1967 35 3.5 24 2.4 
1968 56 5.6 25 2.5 
1969 36 3.6 23 2.3 
1970 42 4.2 16 1 .6 
2.6%, 2.5%, 3.0%, and 1.6%. In every year studied 
there has been an overall increase in policemen hired-- 
the highest being a 3.1% increase in 1968 over 1967 and 
the lowest being a 0.6% increase in 1969 over 1968. 
Absentee Rates 
Absentee rates due to reported illness and those 
due to accidents suffered on the job are on the increase. 
With the exception of 1965, lost time due to illness 
has been on the rise and has proceeded from 3.0% in 
1966 to a high of 3.9% in 1970.^ The year 1965 had a 
3.2% absentee rate per department. 
Likewise, absentee rates due to accidents have 
increased steadily from a low of 0.9% in 1965 to a high 
of 1.6% in 1970 (see Table 5.1?). 
Effect o_n Labor-Management Re 1 at ions 
From the information obtained in this study, it 
would appear that the presence of a compulsory arbitra¬ 
tion law has had an effect on labor-management relations. 
Thus general hypothesis number three would be accepted. 
It stated: The presence of a_ compu 1 so ry a rb i t rat i on 
^These absentee rates were compiled by using 
formula #2 as presented in : Dale Yoder, H. G. Heneman, 
John Turnbull, and C. Harold Stone, Handbook of Rersonne1 
Management and Labor Re 1 at ions, (New York: McGraw-Hi11 
Book Company, Inc., 1958), p. 14-37. 
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TABLE 5.12 
ABSENTEE RATES FOR THE COMMUNITIES SURVEYED IN THE STUDY 
OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 




1 11 ness 
Due to 
Accidents Total 
1965 3.2 0.9 4. 1 
1 966 3.0 1 . 1 4. 1 
1967 3.0 1 . 1 4; r 
1 968 3.2 1.5 h.7 
1969 •3.6 1.5 5.1 
1970 3.9 1 .6 5’. 5 
% 
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board has had an effect on the 1 abor-management 
re 1 ations in those commun ? ties that have had an 
expe rience with a compu1sory arbitration boa rd. 
In analyzing these data, it appears that this 
effect on the relationship has been a direct result of 
a changed power structure. Since 1968, when the law 
was passed police labor organizations have been able to 
use compulsory arbitration and have done so to their 
advantage. This makes the Fraternal Order of Police 
and the International Brotherhood of Police Officers 
powerful in addition to the increasing number of police 
office rs. 
In all the communities studied, the corporate 
authority now takes an active part in negotiations. 
The police labor organization now has some recourse if 
the offer is not considered by them to be in the best 
interests of its membership. The corporate authority 
is well aware of this and thus is more .concerned with 
negotiations. 
A few of the mayors or town officials are the 
chief negotiators for their community. This has its 
advantages because the union negotiators feel that they 
are negotiating with the highest official in the 
community. In addition, since the elected official is 
% 
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the representative of the' general public i n that 
community he should be on the negotiating committee. 
One disadvantage of having an elected official as the 
negotiator for the corporate authority is that he may 
not be qualified as a negotiator. 
In a majority of the cities and towns, the 
attorney representing the union is the chief negotiator. 
Policemen feel that this is in their best interest. By 
having a professional negotiator opposing the corporate 
authority, bargaining statures are equalized. 
It also appears after analyzing the information 
obtained that police departments cooperate with each 
other in bargaining with the corporate authority. The 
many police locals in Rhode Island cooperate with each 
other as well as with locals in different sectors. 
However, there is no evidence that the corporate 
authorities in the state use this cooperation in bar¬ 
gaining to the same degree as the union does. If the 
corporate authorities desire to offset the power base 
that the union is building, they are going to have to 
work together in a coalition type atmosphere. 
Other Responses 
In addition to the responses obtained from the 
union officials and the corporate authorities reported 
above, personnel directors and arbitrators stated their 
positions on several additional questions which follow: 
i 
o) the effect of compulsory arbitration on collective 
bargaining; (2) whether or not compulsory arbitration 
discouraged collective bargaining; (3) whether or not 
compulsory arbitration insured municipal peace; and 
(4) whether or not compulsory arbitration enhanced 
unions power and growth. 
Four of the five personnel directors stated that 
compulsory arbitration has had an effect on collective 
bargaining and that this effect has been an adverse one. 
As the personnel directors observe their operations, 
it appears to them that this compulsory arbitration 
statute permits manipulation-. It enables the parties 
to have an out if they want to ’take advantage of the 
situation. The corporate authority uses arbitration to 
give the policemen a raise in wages that the public 
would not approve. The union official uses arbitration 
as a scapegoat if all the demands are not met. In 
addition, four of five reported that they felt compul¬ 
sory arbitration did enhance union power and growth but 
that it did not insure municipal peace. The fifth 
personnel director held the opposite view to that of 
his colleagues. 
With regard to the same questions, seven of nine 
corporate authority arbitrators (78 per cent) stated 
that compulsory arbitration has had an effect on collec¬ 
tive bargaining, four of six union arbitrators (61 per 
cent) also held this position, and all eight neutral 
arbitrators (100 per cent) held similar views. 
Of the corporate authority arbiters, six stated 
that they did not feel that compulsory arbitration 
discouraged collective bargaining. All gave the im¬ 
pression that they felt that arbitration was a tool to 
be used if and when negotiations reached an impasse. 
Eight of the nine arbitrators felt that compulsory 
arbitration enhanced union power and growth. Both 
power and growth are enhanced in the sense that it en¬ 
ables the union to obtain a decision both in grievance 
and contract negotiation. One arbitrator stated that 
compulsory arbitration retards union power and growth, 
and only the strike weapon could enhance it. Six of the 
nine stated that compulsory arbitration did not insure 
municipal peace basically because of the "whipsaw 
effect".^ Three of the six corporate authority 
12For example, if the policemen used arbitration 
to obtain a contract and were satisfied, another depart¬ 
ment in another town or a different group in the same 
town would try to obtain a similar package. Then the 
police would want even more, so it would have to go 
back to arbitration the,next year. 
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arbitrators stated that each side was aware of the 
finality of a binding agreement and each would accept 
the award as rendered. 
The union arbitrators also felt that compulsory 
arbitration has an effect on collective bargaining. In 
three of the six responses it was stated that compulsory 
arbitration discourages collective bargaining because 
both sides have the feeling that they must go to 
arbitration; whereas, many of the issues could be agreed 
upon if both sides were reasonable and would bargain in 
good faith. On the question of whether or not compul¬ 
sory arbitration discouraged collective bargaining, the 
other three union arbitrators leaned in the negative 
direction but had no comments. Three out of six union 
arbitrators stated that compulsory arbitration enhanced 
union power and growth. The reasons given for this 
enhancement were that the policemen now have a weapon 
to fight for increased demands as well as a tool to 
increase membership and power. Three other arbitrators 
stated that there was no connection between arbitration 
and a union's power and growth. One-half of the 
arbitrators did not think that municipal peace would 
necessarily prevail following an award although all 
arbitrators surmised that all parties would work with a 
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binding award. 
All eight neutral arbitrators felt that compul- 
$ 
sory arbitration affects collective bargaining. Six of 
these eight expressed the opinion that compulsory 
arbitration discourages good faith collective bargaining 
It was stated that arbitration, or the easy way out, 
was chosen in order that blame could not be attached to 
one of the parties. During negotiations, the two sides 
do not discuss any proposals or counter-proposals, but 
rather select their attorneys and arbitrators for the 
arbitration hearing. 
On the question of relating arbitration and the 
enhancement of unions' power and growth, four neutral 
arbitrators stated that this was the case and the other 
four responded by stating that such a possibility 
existed. Growth of the union organization is directly 
related to the gains it makes for this same organization 
In this respect of gains made, unions have grown and, 
with this growth comes power. 
The neutral arbitrators were split as to whether 
or not compulsory arbitration would insure municipal 
peace. On the "pro" side, since awards may be in 
existence for no more than one year and if the police 
organization does not approve of its award, it has 
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another opportunity for a change in contract in a 
reasonably short period of time. On the "con" side, 
four members stated that nothing can or will insure 
peace. 
Opinions Regarding Compulsory Arbitration 
in Rhode Island 
In order to ascertain the opinions persons had 
regarding binding, compulsory arbitration in Rhode 
Island, each individual interviewed in this study was 
asked the following questions: 
(1) Were you satisfied with the decisions made by 
the compulsory arbitration board? 
(2) Do you think the other parties involved with 
compulsory arbitration were satisfied with 
the decisions made by the board? 
(3) To what extent is compulsory arbitration used 
to take the pressure off one or another party? 
(4) Should there be any changes in compulsory 
arbitration boards? 
(5) Should there be any changes in the procedures 
followed by the board?*3 
Part1cipants 1 Opinions of Cornpu1sory Arbit ration 
The members of the corporate authority in five 
(42 per cent) of the localities covered by this study 
indicated that they were satisfied with the final 
decision made by the board concerning their police 
department's contract (see Table 5.13). The general 
13See Appendix B. 
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TABLE 5.13 
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND 
EXPRESSED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE CORPORATE 
AUTHORITY AS COMPARED WITH THEIR 
PERCEPTION OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS' 
SATISFACTION, 1971 
Pa rticipants 







Corporate Authority 5 7 0 
Perceived Feelings 
Union Official 4 6 2 
Personnel Director 0 3 2 
Corporate Authority 3 7 2 
Arbit rators 8 1 3 
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comment by these five administrators was that the 
arbitration board's award was a fair and equitable one. 
The seven members (58 per cent) that were dissat¬ 
isfied with 'the arbitration award complained bitterly 
about a third.party entering their communities and 
establishing wage rates and indirectly establishing tax 
rates for the general public. It was also stated that 
in rendering these decisions, the arbitrators did not 
weigh the financial positions of the communities 
adequately. These administrators definitely felt that 
the culprit behind these "outrageous" settlements was 
the statute that permitted binding arbitration. Since 
the law states that the arbitrators have to take into 
account prevailing wage rates in the community (i.e. 
wages paid to the trades and to employees in industry), 
this is the basis on which the arbitrators make deci¬ 
sions. Admittedly this practice takes place, but it 
appeared to the researcher that it did- so only to a 
slight degree. The two major bases that arbitrators 
used to arrive at a decision were: first, comparable 
wage rates in the public sector, specifically using 
police departments in other surrounding localities; and 
second, the community's actual ability to pay. 
When each of the corporate authorities was asked 
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how he thought the other members of the corporate 
authority felt about decisions made in their respective 
localities, three reported they thought satisfaction 
prevailed generally, seven reported the corporate 
authority was .dissatisfied overall, and two members 
reported that they had no opinion. The prevailing 
reasoning for the dissatisfaction was that of having a 
third party enter a community and set the tax rates 
indirectly through the awards. 
Sixty-six per cent of the administrators reported 
that they surmised the arbitrators, as individuals, 
were satisfied with the decisions they rendered. One 
member of the corporate authority stated that he did 
not think the arbitrators were satisfied with the 
decision, but refused to comment on that statement. 
Three other administrators were noncommittal on the 
question. It appears that satisfaction is measured by 
the parties involved by whether or not- the decision and 
award is unanimously approved by all the arbiters. It 
did enter the minds of several of the corporate author¬ 
ities that possibly the arbitrator chosen by them was 
incompetent at arbitration and did not know all the 
ramifications of what he was signing. Some corporate 
authorities just assumed if the arbitrator signed the 
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award and did not file a dissent he was satisfied. 
In those communities with personnel departments, 
three administrators stated the personnel directors 
were dissatisfied with the award for the same reasons, 
and two had no comment. 
Surprisingly, only four administrators (33 per 
cent) thought that the union was satisfied with the 
award when in actuality eight union officials reported 
they were satisfied (see Table 5.1^). The administra¬ 
tors that reported the union was not satisfied did with 
the explanation that unions are never satisfied.. One 
member reported that the union in his community was not 
satisfied because the arbitration award was lower in 
terms of dollars than the locality had offered in 
negotiations. 
The union officials reported to be satisfied with 
the decisions also said that they felt other union 
officials and the rank and file membership were satis¬ 
fied on the whole with the decisions handed down in the 
respective communities. A possible explanation for 
this is that union officials might not have been 
totally satisfied with the arbitrators' decision, but 
they were extremely satisfied with the idea of compul¬ 
sory arbitration and the possibilities for the future 
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TABLE 5.14 
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE 
•COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND 
EXPRESSED BY THE UNION OFFICIALS AS 
COMPARED WITH THEIR PERCEPTION 
OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS' 
SATISFACTION, 1971 





Actua1 Fee 1 inqs 
Union Officia 1 8 4 0 
Perceived Feelinqs 
» 
Corporate Authority 3 9 0 
Personnel Director 0 5 0 
Union Official 4 4 4 
Arbit rators f; c 2 
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because of the new statute. 
'Union officials agreed three to one that the 
corporate authority was not satisfied with the decision 
made by the board. An obvious explanation for this 
feeling lies in the fact that thirty-eight of the 
administrators in the cities and towns in Rhode Island 
expressed disapproval in the statute when it was in the 
General Assembly, and only one mayor approved of it. 
The corporate authority had made it apparent to the 
union that a third party setting the tax rates is 
incompatible with its notion of how to run a government. 
All five union officials in localities where 
there was a personnel department reported that it was 
their belief that the personnel director was not 
satisfied with the award for the same reasons as those 
given for the corporate authority, that is, having a 
third party enter a community and setting the tax rates 
indirectly through the award. 
Five union officials (42 per cent) reported that 
they thought the arbitrators were satisfied with the 
decisions, five reported non-satisfaction, and two had 
no comments. Apparently the union approached this 
question in the same way as did the corporate authority. 
If an arbitrator dissented, this was assumed to be clear 
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evidence of dissatisfaction. As will be discussed 
later, this assumption may be misleading. 
All but one of the personnel directors reported 
that, they were satisfied with the decisions made by the 
compulsory arbitration board in their community (see 
Table 5.15). These four personnel directors stated 
that the arbitration award did not, in their best 
judgment, change the financial position of the community. 
It allowed the administrator of the locality to maintain 
the list of priorities in every case. The one personnel 
director who reported his dissatisfaction with the 
decision made claimed that a third party making 
decisions in a community will affect the tax rate. 
The personnel directors were unanimous in stating 
that the arbitrators as individuals were satisfied with 
the decisions they made. The statements made by these 
personnel directors were also unanimous since each 
reported that his colleagues were dissatisfied with 
compulsory arbitration in their respective community. 
Each personnel director reported that he felt the 
corporate authorities were satisfied with the decisions 
in their communities. The reason for this was that the 
arbitration award did not cost the community as much as 
the administration had anticipated. 
TABLE 5.15 
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND 
EXPRESSED BY THE PERSONNEL DIRECTORS AS 
COMPARED WITH THEIR PERCEPTION 
OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS' 
SATISFACTION, 1971 





Actua1 Fee 1 inqs 
Personnel Director 4 1 0 
Perceived Feelinqs • 
Corporate Authority 5 0 0 
Union Officia 1s 2 2 1 
Personnel Directors 0 5 0 
Arbit rators 4 0 1 
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It was also felt by two of the personnel directors 
that the union was satisfied, by two that the union was 
dissatisfied, and one had no comment. In the cases 
where the personnel directors felt the union was 
satisfied, it was reported that the union received more 
in the award than it believed possible. In two cases 
reported by the personnel directors, it was believed 
the union was dissatisfied because in one case the 
union president was voted out of office and, in the 
second case, the labor organization refused to pay its 
portion of the arbitration cost. 
Of the twenty-four arbitrators interviewed in 
this study, sixteen (66 per cent) reported that they 
were completely satisfied with their decisions and 
awards handed down in their respective communities (see 
Tables 5.16, 5.17, and 5.18). Seven of these arbiters 
were hired by the corporate authority, two were union 
arbiters, and eight were neutral arbiters. Only two 
arbiters representing the administration and two 
representing the union stated that they were dissatis¬ 
fied with the arbitration award in which they took part. 
The remaining two arbitrators, both from the union, had 
no comments- to offer on this question. 
Even though all three arbitrators are theoretica11y 
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TABLE 5.16 
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND 
EXPRESSED BY THE CORPORATE AUTHORITY 
ARBITRATORS AS COMPARED WITH THEIR 
PERCEPTION OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS' 
SATISFACTION, 1971 





Actua1 Fee 1 inqs 
Corporate Authority 
A rbite r 7 2 0 
Perceived Feelinqs 
Corporate Authority 6 2 1 
Union Officia 1 7 0 2 
Personnel Director 5 0 0 




TABLE '5. 17 
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE 
•COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND 
EXPRESSED BY THE UNION ARBITRATORS AS 
COMPARED WITH THEIR PERCEPTION 
OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS' 
SATISFACTION, 1971 





Actua1 Fee 1inqs 
Union Arbiter 2 2 2 
Perceived Feelinqs 
> 
Corporate Authority 1 2 3 
Union OfficI a 1 2 1 3 
Personnel Director 1 1 3 
Other Arbit rators 2 1 3 
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TABLE 5.18 
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND 
EXPRESSED BY THE NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS AS 
COMPARED V/ITH THEIR PERCEPTION 







Actua1 Fee 1inqs 
Neutral Arbiter 8 0 0 
Perceived Feelinqs 
Corporate Authority 5 3 0 
Union Official h 3 1 
Personnel Director 5 0 0 
Other Arbitrators 7 1 0 
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impartial, the majority of these persons reportedly are 
to some extent favorable to the side that appoints them. 
The only truly impartial arbitrator is the third person 
selected by the other two. It appears that those 
arbitrators who reported being satisfied with the 
decisions made in their case were able to confine the 
award within the boundaries that were set for them by 
their respective sides. In comparing the figures 
previously reported concerning the corporate authorities 
satisfaction and those figures relating to the represent¬ 
atives (i.e. their arbitrators) of the.corporate- 
authorities, a discrepancy is found. Seven administra¬ 
tors and arbitrators agreed as to the satisfactions or 
dissatisfactions resulting from the award in their 
respective localities. However, five arbitrators 
reportedly felt that the corporate authority was 
satisfied with the decision when in fact the administra¬ 
tor stated he was not satisfied. 
Five arbitrators' reported that they were satisfied 
with the award and in agreement with the statements 
made by the union. Two arbitrators were dissatisfied 
as were the corresponding union officials in those 
communities. More will be stated about these relation¬ 
ships later in this chapter. 
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All the neutral arbitrators stated that they were 
satisfied with the decisions that their boards handed 
« 
down. 
When the arbitrators were asked about how they 
thought their colleagues felt about the decision 
rendered, only three expressed a different feeling than 
they themselves felt. One corporate authority arbitra¬ 
tor who was dissatisfied with the decisions rendered in 
his community reportedly thought that it was the general 
rule for arbitrators to be satisfied. Another arbitrator 
for the administration expressed the opposite view. He 
felt that although he was satisfied, generally the 
arbitrator for the corporate authority is dissatisfied. 
His reasoning for this was that arbitration boards are 
"pro" labor. He would make no’further comments on this 
question. One union arbitrator that was reportedly 
dissatisfied stated that most union arbitrators were 
satisfied with decisions made in their communities. He 
just happened to have taken part in an arbitration 
award which was lower than the locality offered before 
arbitration took place (see Appendix D, Tables 4, 5, 6, 
and 7 for cross reference). 
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Use of Arbitration to Reduce Responsibi1ity for Decis ?ons 
It was reported earlier that there was a discrep¬ 
ancy between the dissatisfactions which were expressed 
by the corporate authority and the satisfactions 
expressed by their appointed arbitrators over the 
decisions and awards in their communities. This kind 
of information supports the idea that both sides 
(corporate authority and union) use compulsory arbitra¬ 
tion as a means for shifting blame. Since both 
officials are elected to their positions, the views 
made available as public information are what the 
constituents desire to hear. It is likely that, for 
public record, town administrators desire to keep the 
policemen's pay as low as possible even though they may 
know the police are underpaid. If an arbitration board 
is convened to issue a decision, a more just settlement 
may well be reached. If the tax rates have to be 
adjusted to pay for an increase, the arbitration board 
is the party to blame. If the union president does not 
deliver the promised increases to the rank and file, 
again the culprit is the arbitration board. 
To try to substantiate this idea of the two 
parties placing the blame on arbitration, the corporate 
authority arid the union president were asked to state 
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their positions on the use of compulsory arbitration as 
a means of taking away the responsibility for decision¬ 
making. In the case of the personnel directors and the 
a rb i.t rators, each was asked his impression of the 
extent to which compulsory arbitration was used as a 
means for shifting blame. 
Ten of the twelve corporate authority officials 
reported that this was the case. Since public pressures 
are so great, compulsory arbitration allows the corporate 
authority to make a decision which would normally be 
unpopular with the general public. Only one administra¬ 
tor stated that he did not employ this technique, and 
one had no comment. 
Nine union officials (74 per cent) reported that 
they used this technique to enhance their position and 
four stated that although the corporate authority used 
this as a method, the unions did not. 
Personnel directors were in total agreement that 
both sides used compulsory arbitration extensively to 
take away the responsibility for decision-making. 
Since the arbitrators selected by each side are 
the representatives of these respective groups in the 
actual arbitration hearings, it would seem that these 
arbiters would work closely with their employers. This 
means that the corporate authority arbiter has to know 
before the tripartite panel convenes how high the 
administration is willing to go and the union arbiter 
has to know the minimum package acceptable to the rank 
and file. It appears that these persons would know 
whether or not each side uses compulsory arbitration as 
a means for shifting blame. If an administrator 
publicly denounces an award, yet the package is within 
the guidelines given to the arbiter, it is likely the 
administrator is using compulsory arbitration to his 
own advantage. The same is true for the union side. 
Seven arbitrators (78 per cent) for the corporate 
authorities stated this practice was used extensively, 
one reported it was used to a slight degree, and one 
reported it was not used. The arbiter who reported 
that this technique was not used was employed by the 
community whose corporate authority stated the same 
position. Thus, there is perfect agreement between the 
arbitrators' answers and those given by the corporate 
authority. 
This agreement between arbitrator and client does 
not exist for the union. The union officials in two 
communities reported that they did not use this kind of 
technique, while the arbitrator had a contrary opinion. 
All but one neutral arbitrator reported that both 
sides used compulsory arbitration as a means for shift¬ 
ing blame, but all declined to relate any specifics. 
From the data it appears that compulsory arbitra¬ 
tion is used to enhance relative positions on the part 
of both unions and corporate authorities. 
Changes ? n Arbit rat ?on Boards 
The consensus of opinion among the members of the 
corporate authority is that there should be changes in 
the makeup of compulsory arbitration boards. Instead 
of having three persons entering a community and making 
awards which eventually determine the tax rates, it 
should be assured that these persons be residents of 
•Rhode Island if not members of the community. 
What the administrators are proposing .is a labor 
court’ that would hear all cases in Rhode Island. This 
labor court would be composed of five residents of the 
state who would be appointed by the governor. The 
admi ri i s t ra tors feel that by having this type of proce¬ 
dure, this court would be better able to comprehend the 
comparative packages in other communities as well as 
packages within a community. 
One possible problem of this type of structure is 
political in nature. It might be a relatively simple 
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matter to stack the board in favor of one side or the 
other depending on the governor's desires. 
Ten of twelve union officials are satisfied with 
the jnakeup of the board and the personnel directors 
approve in a like proportion. 
The arbitrators overwhelmingly disapprove of any 
changes in the system now used in this state. Their 
reaction is one of fairness because they believe that 
it is fair and equitable for each side to be able to 
choose the representative that they think will enhance 
their position the most. These two representatives 
choose a third party whom they know to be impartial 
thereby enhancing the objectivity of the board. 
Changes _i_n Procedu re Iby the Boa rd 
Eighty per cent of the administrators, the union 
officials, arid the personnel directors are satisfied 
with the procedures followed by the board. It appears 
to them that the tripartite board analyzes the informa¬ 
tion given to them in the hearings and acts accordingly. 
The other twenty per cent who reportedly would change 
the board's procedure would take away the opportunity 
for compromise among issues. Instead of the arbiters 
making compromises between the number of days off arid 
wages for example, each side would prepare a package 
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and the arbitration board would select one of the two 
packages in their entirety. 
The corporate authority arbitrators by a vote of 
67 per cent to 33 per cent elect to have no changes in 
procedure. The union's arbitrators are 50 per cent in 
favor of a change in procedures; whereas, 75 per cent 
of the neutral arbitrators are in favor of a change. 
It is apparent from these figures that the neutral 
arbitrators are more prone to experiment with a last 
package offer. Since this kind of approach has never 
been instituted anywhere in the world prior to this 
date it might prove to be a worthwhile experience. 
Summary 
It was possible to interview all those parties in 
the twelve communities that had been involved in 
binding, compulsory arbitration. Those persons inter¬ 
viewed were: 
(1) The top ranking officer of the policemen's 
association; 
(2) The top ranking official of the corporate 
authority; 
(3) The personnel director; 
(4) Each of the three arbitrators involved with 
the decisions. 
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On the basis of the information obtained in the 
interviews, conclusions were drawn on the operational 
« 
hypotheses and on the general hypotheses. In addition, 
the practical significance of the general hypotheses to 
Rhode Island was discussed. 
Opinions were obtained from all persons inter¬ 
viewed regarding compulsory arbitration in Rhode Island. 
The opinions discussed in this chapter included those on 
the use of arbitration to reduce responsibility for 
decision-making, changes in the compulsory arbitration 
boards, and changes in the procedures followed by 
compulsory arbitration boards. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Collective bargaining in the public sector has 
been undergoing a vast and far-reaching transition in 
the last decade. Every year the number of union 
members in this sector of the economy is increasing. 
With this increase in the number of union personnel 
comes substantial change in work relationships and 
working conditions including the possible increase in 
work stoppages. Although strikes by public employees 
are prohibited in nearly every state, such stoppages 
have occurred with increasing frequency in recent years 
In 1968, the State of Rhode Island instituted a 
process which was intended to give public erpployees an 
alternative to work stoppages. This 'a 1ternative is 
binding, compulsory arbitration. Since Rhode Island 
has made no provision for compiling any information on 
the experience under the act, it would seem that a 
detailed analysis of one area of coverage would aid all 
parties concerned. The sector covered in this report i 
the police departments which have utilized binding, 




Primary sources of data in this study included: 
(1) the General Laws of the State of Rhode Island; and 
(2) .interviews with the following: officers of the 
policeman's association, members of the corporate 
authority, individuals who have been neutral arbitrators, 
arbitrators for the union, arbitrators for the corporate 
authority, and personnel directors for the cities and/or 
towns which have been affected by this legislation. 
The methodological procedure consisted of two 
parts: First, a detailed analysis of the state -lav; 
which provides for the implementation of the compulsory 
arbitration board; and second, using a structured 
questionnaire, members of the policeman's association, 
members of the corporate authority, arbitrators, and 
personnel directors were interviewed in those cities 
and/or towns that have had experience with a compulsory 
a rbit ration boa rd. 
Three general hypotheses were used to test the 
f o1 lowing: 
(1) The relationship of the geographic location 
to the utilization of a compulsory arbitra- 
tion boa rd; 
(2) The relationship of the size of the bargaining 
unit to the utilization of a compulsory 
arbitration board; and 
150 
(3) The effect of the compulsory arbitration boards 
on the labor-management relationship. 
Operational hypotheses were used to test the 
general hypotheses. 
Results 
According to the data collected in this study it 
is possible to state that: 
(1) There is a significant relationship between 
the population in a geographic location and 
the utilization of a compulsory arbitration 
board; (i.e. the larger the population the 
more likely compulsory arbitration will be 
utilized to settle an impasse in that 
community). 
(2 ) The re is a significant relationship between 
the form of government in a geographic 
location and the utilization of a compulsory 
arbitration board; (i.e. cities are more 
likely to utilize compulsory arbitration than 
a re towns). 
(3) There is a significant relationship between 
the number of full-time policemen in a 
geographic location and the utilization of a 
compulsory arbitration board; (i.e. the 
greater the number of policemen in a 
community, the more likely compulsory 
arbitration will be utilized to settle an 
impasse in that community). 
(4) There is a significant relationship between 
the number of members in a bargaining unit 
and the utilization of a compulsory arbitra¬ 
tion board; (i.e. the larger the bargaining 
unit the more likely compulsory arbitration 
will be utilized to settle an impasse in that 
community). 
(5) - Policemen feel that the compulsory arbitration 
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board has affected the collective bargaining 
process. The most important effect has been 
to make collective bargaining more realistic 
since this statute forces the employer to 
offer proposals and counterproposals. 
(6) The members of the corporate authority feel 
that compulsory arbitration has affected the 
collective bargaining process in that compul¬ 
sory arbitration has caused administrators to 
pay more attention to collective bargaining. 
Since there is a possibility of an unjust 
award on the part of the arbitrators, admin¬ 
istrators feel decision-making under collec¬ 
tive bargaining is far superior to compulsory 
arbitration. Binding, compulsory arbitration 
hinders collective bargaining according to 
administrators because they are apprehensive 
about making known their last offer. 
Even though there are faults to be found with the 
statute as it stands, the persons who have participated 
in this kind of decision-making process appear generally 
satisfied with the results produced so far. 
Imp1ications 
Despite all the warranted and unwarranted criti¬ 
cisms about compulsory arbitration, the fact remains 
that the overwhelming majority of persons interviewed 
in this report agree that binding, compulsory arbitra¬ 
tion is far superior to settling disputes than the 
right to strike would be. Eleven persons thought that 
^See for instance: Damon Stetson, "Union Official 
Scores Arbitration as Costly and Time-Consuming," The 
New York Sunday Times, May 30, 1971. 
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the right to strike should be granted to policemen as 
opposed to fifty-three who favored compulsory arbitra¬ 
tion. 
It seems clear that every worker should have 
certain basic requirements met by the employer in terms 
of wages, hours, and working conditions. If these 
requirements are not met, the employees should have 
some recourse to force the employer to upgrade any 
lacking conditions. Although the most effective way in 
which to obtain this goal is through the use of the 
strike, certain groups of people (namely fire fighters 
and policemen) probably should not have this right. 
The primary reason is that these two groups of employees 
help protect the health and safety of the general public. 
» 
Unqua1? fied Participants 
Since binding, compulsory arbitration appears to 
be here to stay, at least in the public sector of the 
economy, members of the corporate authority and union 
officials have to learn that money which is saved in 
hiring incompetent arbitrators is lost when this arbi¬ 
trator affixes his signature to an award. If, in an 
attempt to save arbitration costs, a city or town 
chooses a city solicitor with no arbitration experience 
as its representative in a hearing, and he enters into 
153 
arbitration with a highly skilled professional arbitrator 
representing the union and a superbly trained neutral 
arbitrator, the city or town will be in a disadvantageous 
position. 
In the majority of cases where one side or the 
other complained vehemently about the award, in the 
researcher's judgment, an unqualified arbitrator had 
been employed. 
Inefficiencies of the Arbit ration P rocess 
One of the major shortcomings of binding, compul¬ 
sory arbitration as observed in this study was the 
complaint of timing. Whenever wages, rates of pay, or 
any other matter requiring appropriation of money by 
‘any.city or town are included as matter of collective 
bargaining, it is the obligation of the bargaining agent 
to serve written notice of request for collective bar¬ 
gaining on the corporate authority. This request must 
be sent at least one hundred and twenty days prior to 
the last day on which money can be appropriated to 
cover the contract period. 
During the time period when negotiations commence 
and an arbitration board is convened, a variety of 
issues are discussed by the two sides. Some of these 
issues are resolved during negotiations. However, when 
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any one issue is submitted to arbitration, all issues 
revert back to the original position and are submitted 
to a rbit ration. 
Instead of an arbitration board having five or 
six issues to decide upon, they often have twenty or 
thirty. Obviously the more issues there are, the more 
time it takes to decide them all, and the higher the 
cost of arbitration. 
One possible solution to this type of problem 
might be the use of an "arsenal of weapons approach". 
If the statute were amended to enable the arbitration 
board to choose whether to hear each issue individually 
and decide on the merits of each, or to employ the 
process of selecting the entire package of one side, 
much time and money might be saved. In either case, if 
both sides are confronted with the possibility of rising 
or falling on the last offer they might we 11 look at 
the package more objectively. In being more objective, 
both sides should be more reasonable. Even if the 
entire package were not adopted, the boundaries of each 
issue would be narrowed considerably.^- 
A second shortcoming of the binding arbitration 
solution reached in a discussion with V/ i 1 1 i am 
J. Fallon, Arbitrator. 
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statute is the resultant limited flexibility allowed 
the negotiating parties. As reported earler, the 
request for collective bargaining must be initiated at 
least one hundred and twenty days prior to the last day 
on which money can be appropriated. In many cases the 
bargaining agent activates requests more than one 
hundred and twenty days prior to this date. Coupled 
with this one hundred and twenty day provision is a 
section of the law which states that no contract shall 
exceed the term of one year and this further limits the 
bargaining flexibility allowed parties. It is very 
likely that negotiations through collective bargaining 
and arbitration may proceed for three out of tlie twelve 
months. This means there is little time to settle 
disputes except on a crisis basis. The elimination of 
the one year limitation would encourage creative 
collective bargaining and should therefore increase 
satisfaction on the part of all parties involved. 
Future Research 
Since this study examined only those communities 
that have had experience with binding, compulsory 
arbitration there has been no comparison of the labor- 
management relationships with those communities that 
have not utilized this means of settling disputes. This 
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would be essential to ascertain how all parties that 
might be involved with binding arbitration feel. 
When the term "all parties" is used, this would 
mean an increase in the scope of a similar study to 
include a sample, if not all, of the rank and file 
policemen. It might also be possible to determine if 
different ranks of policemen have different feelings 
about compulsory arbitration. It is possible that the 
law could be improved significantly by those who are 
most affected by it--the policemen. 
Another research project would be one which would 
compare adjacent cities and/or towns whose boundary is 
the state line. It would be interesting to compare the 
1abor-management relationship in one city that has 
utilized compulsory arbitration and these same relation 
ships in an adjoining city or town whose police depart¬ 
ment is unable to take their case to a binding 
a rbit ration boa rd. 
These research projects would provide increased 
knowledge of the effects of binding, compulsory arbitra 
tion and could be used to establish better labor 
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A SURVEY OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY 
ARBITRATION BOARDS IN THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 
AMD PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS AS OF MAY, 1971. 
Questionna\re For Union Officials 
Part I Face Sheet Data 
Name of Interviewee: _ 
Title of Interviewee: 
Data of Interview: _ 
Location of Interest: 
Name of Union: 
Comments: 
172 
Part II Interview Data 
1. Are any law enforcement officers on your police 
force members of a union organization? (Mote: 
Union organization would include the FOP.) 
Yes No 
If your answer is 
questions: 
Yes, please answer ■ the following 
a) To which union do they belong? 
b) How many are 
organization? 
dues paying members of the union 
0- 24 175-199 350-374 
25- 49 200-224 375-399 
50- 74 . 225-249 400-424 
75- 99 250-274 425-449 
100-124 275-299 450-474 
125-149 300-324 475-499 
150-174 325-349 500 and ove r 
c) How many a re non-members of the ba rgaini i ng uni 
0- 24 175-199 350-374 
25- 49 200-224 375-399 
50- 74 225-249 400-424 * 




125-149 300-324 475-499 
150-174 325-349 500 and ove r_ 
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2. Ware /ou satisfied with the decisions made by the 
arbitration board? 
Yes_No_ 
Why or why not? 
3. Do you believe the other union officials and members 
were satisfied with the decisions made by the 
a rbit ration boa rd ? 
Yes_ No_ — 
Why or why not? 
4. Do you believe the personnel directors were satisfied 
with the decisions made by the arbitration board? 
Yes _ No_ 
Why or why not? 
5. Do you believe the corporate authority was satisifed 
with the decisions made by the arbitration board? 
Yes No. 
Why or why not? 
1 74 
6. Do you believe the arbitrators were satisfied with 
trie decisions made by the arbitration board? 
Yes_No_ 
Why or why not? 
7. Do you feel the compulsory arbitration board has 
has any effect on collective bargaining? 
Yes_No _ 
a) I f • Y e s: 
1) In what ways has collective bargaining 
been affected? 
2) Why has collective bargaining been 
affected? 
b) If No: 
1) Why has collective bargaining not been 
affected? 
175 
8. Do you believe that compulsory arbitration insures 
municipal (governmental) peace? 
Yes _ No_ 
a) if Yes: 
1) In what ways has compulsory arbitration 
insured peace? 
2) Why does compulsory arbitration insure 
peace? 
b) If No: 
1) Why does compulsory arbitration not 
insure peace? 
3. Do you feel that compulsory arbitration enhances 
union power and growth? 
Yes _ No _ 
a) If Yes: 
1) In what ways has compulsory arbitration 
enhanced union power and growth? 
2) Why does compulsory arbitration enhance 
union power and growth? 
176 
b) If Mo: 
1) Why does compulsory 
enhance union power 
arbit ration not 
and growth? 
Do you be 1 ieve that compu1 sor/ arbitration d i s - 
cou rages col 1ective ba rgaining? 
Yes Mo 
a) If Yes # • 
i) In v/hat ways has compulsory arb it ration 
aiscou ra 
• 
ged collect ive bargaini ng? 
2) Why does compu1sory arbit ration d i s - 
cou rage co11ective ba rgaining? 
b) If No: 
n Why does compu1sory a rbit ration not 
discourage collective bargaining? 
11. Do you feel anything should be changed regarding 
compulsory arbitration boards? (For example: the 
makeup of the board, how the arbitrators are 
chosen, etc.) 
Yes . No 
177 
a) If Yes: 
1) What should be done? 
2) Why? 
b) If ho: 
1) Why? 
12. Do you fee' anything should be changed regarding 
procedures followed by compulsory arb'tration 
boards? (For example: neutral arbitrator accept¬ 
ing an entire package /s. splitting the difference.) 
Yes _ No _ 
a) If Yes: 
1) What snould be done? - 
2) Why? 
b) If No: 
1) Why? 
178 
13. How do arbitrators reach their decisions? 
14. To what extent is arbitration used to take the heat 
‘off one or another party? 
15. Is there anything I should have asked in this 
interview but did not? 
Yes _ No _ 
Please exp 1 ain. 
179 
A SURVEY OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY 
ARBITRATION BOARDS IN THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS AS OF MAY, 1971. 
Questionnaire For Corporate Authority 
Part I Face Sheet Data 
Name of Interviewee: __ 
Title of Interviewee: 
Date of Interview: _ 
Location of Interest: 
Comments: 
180 
Part II Interview Data 
1. Were you satisfied with the decisions made by the 
arbit ration boa rd? 
Yes __ No _____ 
Why or wh.y not? 
2. Do you believe the other members of the corporate 
authority were satisfied with the decisions made 
by the arbitration board? 
Yes __ No _ 
Why or why not? 
3. Do you believe the personnel directors were satisfied 
with the decisions made by the arbitration board? 
Yes _ No_ 
Why or why not? 
4. Do you believe the arbitrators were satisfied with 
the decisions made by the arbitration board? 
Yes No 
Why or why not? 
181 
5. Do you believe the un'ion was. satisfied with the 
decisions made by the arbitration board? 
Yes _ No _ 
Why or why not? 
6. Do you feel the compulsory arbitration board has 
had any effect on collective bargaining? 
Yes No 
a) If Yes: 
i) In what ways has collective bargaining 
been affected? 
. 
2) Why has collective bargaining been 
affected ? 
b) If No: 
i) Why has collecti ve bargaining not been 
affected? 
7. Do you believe that compulsory arbitration insures 
municipal (governmental) peace? 
‘Yes No 
182 
a) If Yes: 
1) In what ways has compulsory arbitration 
insured peace? 
2) Why does compulsory arbitration insure 
peace? 
b) If No: 
1) Why does compulsory arbitration not 
insure peace? 
8. Do you feel that compulsory arbitration enhances 
union power and growth? 
'Yes_ No_ 
a ) If Yes: 
1) In what ways has compulsory arbitration 
enhanced union power and growth? 
2) Why does compulsory arbitration enhance 
union power and growth? 
b) If No: 
183 
1) Why does compulsory arbitration not 
enhance union power and growth? 
9. Do you believe that compulsory arbitration dis¬ 
courages collective bargaining? 
Yes _ No _ 
a) If Yes: 
1) In what ways has compulsory arbitration 
discouraged collective bargaining? 
2) Why does compulsory arbitration dis¬ 
courage collective bargaining? 
b) If Nck 
1) Why does compulsory arbitration not 
discourage collective bargaining? 
10. Do you feel anything should.be changed regarding 
compulsory arbitration boards? (For example: the 





a) If Yes: 
1) What should be done? 
2) Why? 
b) If No: 
1) Why? 
11. Do you feel anything should be changed regarding 
procedures followed by compulsory arbitration 
boards? (For example: neutral arbitrator accept¬ 
ing an entire package vs. splitting the difference.) 
Yes _ No _ 
a) If Yes: 
1) What should be done? 
2) Why? 
b) If No: 
1) Why? 
185 
12. How do arbitrators reach their decisions? 
13, To what extent is arbitration used to take the heat 
off one or another party? 
14. Is there anything I should have asked in this 




A SURVEY OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY 
ARBITRATION BOARDS IN THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS AS OF MAY, 1971 . 
Questionnaire For Public Personnel Directors 
Part I Face Sheet Data 
Name of Interviewee: _ 
Title of Interviewee: 
Date of Interview: _ 




Part II Interview Data 
1. Which of the following best describes the geographic 
location within which your police department 
operates? 
City Other (please specify 
T own • 
What is your populat i on? 
0- 9,999 100,000- 109,999 
10,000- 19,999 110,000- 119,999 
20,000- 29,999 120,000- 129,999 
30,000- 39,999 130,000- 139,999 
40,000- 49,999 140,000- 149,999 





70,000- 79,999 170,000- 179,999 
80,000- 89,999 180,000- 189,999 
90,000- 99,999 190,000 and over 
What ranks are el igi b 1 e for uni on membership 
Yes No 
Chief 
Deputy Ch i ef 
Ma j o r 
Capta i n 
Lieutenant 
Se rgeant 
Pat ro1 man 
Me t e r Maids 
Yes No 
188 
4. Which of the following ranges best describes the 
total number of law enforcement officers in your 
police department? 
0- 24 175-199 350-374 
25- 49 200-224 375-399 
50- 74 225-249 400-424 
75- 99 250-274 425-449 
100-124 275-299 ' 450-474 ' ■ 
125-149 300-324 475-499 
150-174 325-349 500 and over 
Has a compulsory 
1ished to solve 
a rbit rat 
any issue 
ion board ever been estab- 
for the police department 
in this comnnun i ty? 
Yes _ No_ 
a ) If Yes : 
1) What issue(s) were decided? 
2) Please explain the nature of the issue(s) 
and the out come(s). 
189 
3) Were you satisfied with the decisions 
made by the arbitration board? 
Yes _ No _ 
Why or why not? 
4) Do you believe other personnel directors 
were satisfied with the decisions made 
by the arbitration board? 
Yes _ No _ 
V/hy or why not? 
5) Do you believe the corporate authority 
was satisfied with the decisions made 
by the arbitration board? 
Yes ' No 
Why or why not? 
6) Do you believe the union was satisfied 
with the decisions made by the arbitra- 
tion boa rd ? 
Yes No 
V/hy or why not? 
190 
7) Do you believe the arbitrators were 
satisfied with the decisions made by 
the arbitration board? 
Yes _ No _ 
Why or why not? 
6. Do you feel the compulsory arbitration board has had 
any effect on collective bargaining? 
Yes _ No_ 
a) If Yes: 
1) In what ways has collective bargaining 
been affected? 
2) Why has collective bargaining been 
affected? 
b) If No: 
1) Why has collective bargaining not been 
affected? 
7. Do you believe that compulsory arbitration insures 




a) If Yes: 
1) In what ways has compulsory arbitration 
insured peace? 
2) Why does compulsory arbitration insure 
peace? 
b) If No: 
1) Why does compulsory arbitration not 
insure peace? 
8. Do you feel that compulsory arbitration enhances 
union power and growth? 
Yes _ No _ 
a ) If Yes: 
1) In what ways has compulsory arbitration 
enhanced union power and growth? 
2) Why does compulsory arbitration enhance 
union power and growth? 
192 
b) If No: 
1) V/hy does compulsory arbitration not 
enhance union power and ‘growth? 
9. Do you believe that compulsory arbitration dis¬ 
courages collective bargaining? 
Yes No 
a) If Yes: 
i) In what ways has compulsory arbitration 
discouraged collective bargaining? 
2) V/hy does compulsory arbitration dis¬ 
courage collective bargaining? 
b) If No: 
# 
n V/hy does compulsory arbitration not 
discourage collective bargaining? 
193 
10. Could you please give mo the number of occurrences 
iri each of the following categories for the period 
spec If led? 
a) Grievance Rates 
1965'_ 
1966 




b) Turnover Rates Accession Rates 
T o l a 1 Acce s s I on s I lew HI res 
1966 _ _ 
1 966 
1967 __ _"" 
1968 
1969 _ _ 
1970 .. . 
Separation Rates 
Total Separations Quits Layoffs 
1966 _ __ 
1966 
1967 ._ __ I_ 
1 968 
1969 _I I_ I__ 
1970 ' _ 
$ 
c) Absentee Kate (Due to Illness) 
1966 
I 966 














11. Could you please give me the amount of wage increase 
in the following years? How much of this was due to 







12. Do you feel anything should be changed regarding 
compulsory arbitration boards? (For example: the 
makeup of the board, how the arbitrators are chosen, 
etc. ) 
Yes _____ No _ 
a) If Yes: 
1) What should be done? 
2) Why? 
b) If No: 
1) Why? 
195 
13. Do you feel anything • shou1d be changed regarding 
procedures followed by compulsory arbitration 
boards? (For example: neutral arbitrator accepting 
an entire package vs. splitting the difference.) 
Yes _ No _ 
•a) If Yes: 
1) What should be done? 
2) Why? 
b) If No: 
1) Why? 
14. Mow do arbitrators reach their decisions? 
15. To what extent is arbitration used to take the heat 
off one or another party? 
16. Is there anything I should have asked in this inter¬ 
view but did not? 
Yes No 
Please explain. 
A SURVEY OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE COMPULSORY 
ARBITRATION BOARDS IN THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS AS OF MAY, 1971 
Questionnaire For Public Arbitrators 
Part I Face Sheet Data 
Name of Interviewee: 
Title of Interviewee: _ 
Date of Interview: _ 
Location of Interest: 
Type of Arbitrator:_ 
union corporate neut ra1 




Part II Interview Data 
1. Did the arbitration board follow a formal operating 
procedure? 
Yes __ No _ 
a) Please exp 1 ain. 
b) Why did the board follow this procedure? 
2. Have you ever arbitrated a case involving a wage 
decision? 
Yes _ No_ 
a) If Yes, was the board operated formally? 
Yes_No_ 
Please exp 1 ain. • 
b) If No, was the board operated formally on the 
non-wage issue? 
Yes No 
Please exp lain. 
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3. Were you satisfied wrth the decisions made by the 
arbitration board? 
Yes _ No _ 
V/hy or why not? 
4. Do you believe the other arbitrators were satisfied 
with the decisions made by the arbitration board? 
Yes _ No _ 
V/hy or why not? 
5. Do you believe the personnel directors were satis¬ 
fied with the decisions made by the arbitration 
board? 
Yes _ No _ 
V/hy or why not? 
6. Do you believe the corporate authority was satisfied 
with the decisions made by the arbitration board? 
Yes_No _ 
V/hy or why not? 
7. Do you believe the union was satisfied with the 
decisions made by the arbitration board? 
199 
Yes _ No 
V/hy or why not? 
3. Do you feel the compulsory arbitration board has had 
any effect on collective bargaining? 
Yes _ No _ 
a) If Yes: 
1) In what ways has collective bargaining 
been affected? 
2) V/hy has collective bargaining been 
affected? 
b) If No: 
1) V/hy has collective bargaining not been 
affected? 
9. Do you believe that compulsory arbitration insures 
municipal (governmental) peace? 
Yes No 
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a) If Yes: 
1) In what ways has compulsory arbitration 
insured peace? 
2) Why does compulsory arbitration insure 
peace ? 
b) If No: 
1) Why does compulsory arbitration not 
insure peace? 
10. Do you feel that compulsory arbitration enhances 
union power and growth? • 
Yes_No_ 
a) If Yes: 
1) In what ways has compulsory arbitration 
enhanced union power and growth? 
2) Why does compulsory arbitration enhance 
union power and growth? 
b) If No: 
201 
1) Why does compulsory arbitration not 
enhance union power and growth? 
11. Do you believe that compulsory arbitration dis¬ 
courages collective bargaining? 
Yes _ No _ 
a) If Yes: 
1) In what ways has compulsory arbitration 
discouraged collective bargaining? 
2) Why does compulsory arbitration dis¬ 
courage collective bargaining? 
b) If No: 
1 ) Why does compulsory arbitration not 
discourage collective bargaining? 
12. Do you feel anything should be changed regarding 
compulsory arbitration boards? (For example: the 




a) If Yes: 
1) What should be done? 
2) Why? 
b) If No: 
1) Why? 
13. Do you feel anything should be changed regarding 
procedures followed by compulsory arbitration 
boards? (For example: neutral arbitrator accept¬ 
ing an entire package vs. splitting the difference.) 
Yes _ No __ 
* 
a) If Yes: 
1) What should be done? 
2) Why? 
b) If No: 
1) Why? 
203 
14. How do arbitrators reach their decisions? 
15. To what -extent is arbitration used to take the heat 
off one or another party? 
16. Is there anything ! should have asked in this 








LISTING OF QUESTIONS USED TO GATHER DATA FOR THE 
GENERAL AND OPERATIONAL HYPOTHESES IN AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONS OF POLICE 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN 
THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND 
PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, 1971 







Numbe r Pe rsonne1 Un i on 
Corporate 
Authority Arbiters 
1 1 2,5 
2 1,5 
1 1 3 4,5 
* 
• 
4 5 1 
5 1 1,2 
I 
6 1,2 




































TABLE 1 207 
POPULATION DATA FOR THE CITIES AND TOWNS 
IN THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, 1971 
City or Town S i ze City or Town S i ze 
New Shoreham 489 South Kingston 16,913 
West Greenwich 1,841 Weste r1y 17,248 
Little Compton 2,385 Ba r rington 17,554 
Richmond 2,625 Bristol 17,860* 
Foster 2,626 Central Falls** 18,716* 
Cha r1estown 2,863 Johnston 22,037 
Jamestown 2,91 1* Covent ry 22,947 
Exeter 3,245 West Warwick 24,323* 
G1oceste r 5,160 North Providence 24,337* 
Hopkinton 5,392 Cumbe r1 and 26,605* 
Na r ragansett 7,138 North Kingston 27,673 
Scituate 7,489 Middletown . • 29,621 
North Smithfield 9,349 Newport** • 34,562 
East Greenwich • 9,577 Woonsocket** 46,820* 
Bu r ri11vi11e 10,087 East Providence** 48,151 
War ren 10,523 C ranston** 73,037* 
Port smouth 12,521 Pawtucket** 76,984* 
Tive rton 12,55 9- W a rwic k** 83,694* 
Smithfield 1 3,468 Providence** 179,213* 
Linco1n 16,182 
*lndicates having utilized compulsory arbitration. 
**lndicates city form of government. 
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TABLE 2 
POLICE MEMBERSHIP IN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE 













West Greenwich 2 • 0 2 
Little Compton 3 0 3 
Richmond 3 0 3 
Foster 5 0 5 
Cha r1estown 4 0 4 
Jamestown 6 1 7 
G1oceste r 7 1 8 
Hopkinton .8 0 8 
Na r ragansett 6 3 9 
Scituate 6 0 6 
North Smithfield 1 2 0 1 2 
East Greenwich 10 0 10 
Burri1lvi1le 13 0 13 
War ren 16 1 17 
Portsmouth 1 1 5 16 
Tive rton 15 0 15 
Smithfie1d 17 0 17 
Lincoln 17 0 17 




















 1 28 
Ba rrington 29 0 29 
B risto1 24 6 30 
Cent ra1 Falls 35 1 36 
Johnston 36 0 36 
Covent ry 28 9 37 
West Warwick 38 0 38 
North Providence 30 1 31 
Cumbe r1 and 3° 0 30 
North Kingston 32 0 32 
Mi dd 1 etov/n 35 1 36 
Newport 41 2 43 
Woonsocket 101 0 101 
East Providence 103 3 106 
C rans tori 62 43 105 
Pawtucket 150 3 153 
Warwick 1 32 18 150 
P rovidence 394 20 414 
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TABLE 3 
MEMBERSHIP IN A POLICE LABOR ORGANIZATION COMPARED WITH 
THE TYPE OF PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN SETTLING DISPUTES 
IN EACH COMMUNITY, 1971 
Comrnunity 





Authority Union Neut ra1 
Bristol 24 F F 1 
Cent ra1 Falls 35 1 F 1 
C ranston 6 2 1 F 1 
Curnbe r 1 and 30 F F F 
Jamestown 6 1 F 1 
North Providence 30 1 F 1 
Pawtucket 150 1 • F F 
P rovidence 394 1 F F 
Tive rton 15 F F F 
Wa rwick 1 30 1 F F 
West Warwick 35 1 F 1 
Woonsocket 101 1 1 1 
F-Indicates a formal operating procedure, 
l-lndicates an informal operating procedure. 
TABLE A 
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND 
EXPRESSED BY THE CORPORATE AUTHORITY AS 
COMPARED WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS' 
PERCEPTION OF THE CORPORATE AUTHOR¬ 







Corporate Authority 5 7 0 
Perceived Feelinqs 
Union Official 3;. 9 0 
Personnel Director 5 0 0 
Corporate Authority 
Arbiter 6 2 1 
Union Arbiter 1 2 3 
Neutral Arbiter 5 0 3 
21 2 
TABLE 5 
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND 
EXPRESSED BY THE UNION OFFICIALS AS COMPARED 
WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTION OF 
THE UNION OFFICIALS' SATISFACTION, 1971 





Actua1 Fee 1inqs 
Union Official 8 4 0 
Perceived Feelinqs 
Corporate Authority 3 
» 
7 2 
Personnel Director 2 2 1 
Corporate Authority 
Arbiter 7 0 2 
Union Arbiter 2 1 3 
Neutral Arbiter 4 3 1 
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TABLE 6 
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND 
EXPRESSED BY THE PERSONNEL DIRECTORS AS 
COMPARED WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS' 
PERCEPTION OF THE PERSONNEL DIRECTORS' 
SATISFACTION, 1971 





Actua1 Fee 1 inqs 
Personnel Director 4 1 0 
Perceived Fee 1inqs 
Corporate Authority • 0 3 2 
Union Official 0 5 0 
Corporate Authority 
Arbiter 3 0 0 
Union Arbiter 1 1 3 
Neutral Arbiter 3 0 0 
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TABLE 7 
ACTUAL FEELINGS OF SATISFACTION REGARDING POLICE 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BOARDS IN RHODE ISLAND 
EXPRESSED BY THE ARBITRATORS AS COMPARED 
WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTION 






Actua1 Fee 1 inqs 
Arbit rators 17 4 2 
Perceived Feelings • 
Corporate Authority ' 8 . 1 3 
Union Officia 1 . 5 5 2 
Personnel Director 5 0 0 

